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The study of ideology is hardly a science; thus, it is difficult 
to implement standardized methodological procedures in its analysis. 
It becomes necessary, therefore, to utilize an optional approach, 
sociology as an art form, in gaining proper insights into the signifi-
cance of ideology as it is manifested in society via values and influ-
ences in regards to how persons act out their lives. The assumption 
which is made here is that when C. Wright Mills described the "socio-
logical imagination," he was referring to individuals acting as whole 
persons aware of ideological constraint. 
A selection of literature dealing with ideology and the sociology 
of knowledge is critically reviewed for purposes of gaining a general 
understanding of the concept. This literature, not exhaustive because 
of time and space considerations, is designed to introduce the main-
stream contributions of Marx, Mannheim, Sorokin and others to the 
controversial nature of ideology. Issues such as "New Left," "Radical 
Sociology" and the "End of Ideology" controversy are reviewed for their 
impact on the concept. In a general sense, ideology is viewed here as 
an "antecedent" variable or one which must be given first consideration 
in any sociological analysis. 
Notation is made that despite the scholastic works of Mannheim and 
others, many writers in sociology use ideology as a catchall mystique 
term whjch is devoid of meaning. In this respect, ideology shares a 
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corrunon fate with other concepts such as "attitude," "culture," 
"society" and "corrununity." Stress has been placed on economic and 
political ideologies or the "prime movers" for most societies. In 
brief, this is a theoretical dissertation which attempts to evaluate 
constituent variables and ideas associated with the concept ideology. 
It does not purport to be a final statement on the subject but more a 
relative approximation of our present knowledge based on the best 
evidence available. 
In essence, this study attempts to take ideology out of the dark 
corridors of the mind and to expose it to the bright sunlight for what 
it actua+ly means to individuals, groups and societies. The ongoing 
question which this dissertation attempts to resolve is formulated in 
the following way: What is this concept--ideology--that has the 
capacity to be "all" or "nothing," "truth" or "distqrtion," "driving 
force" or "deterrent" all rolled up into one "entity" or "package deal" 
as corporate symbolism would have it? 
The writer wishes to extend his deep gratitude to Dr. Ivan Chapman, 
dissertation adviser, who gave so much of his time in behalf of this 
theoretical project. Hearty thanks are due also to other members of the 
committee: Dr. Jack E. Bynum, Dr. Donald A. Tennant and Dr. Kenneth 
St. Clair. The writer wishes to dedicate this dissertation to his 
lovely wife, Barbara, who has worked so many long hours typing and 
proofreading the manuscript. A word of acknowledgment is due also to 
Mr. and Mrs. Paul Britt of Stamps, Arkansas, who have made their 
charming home my favorite "study" for the past few years. 
Support for this dissertation was provided by Henderson State 
University, Arkadelphia, Arkansas, which provided the writer with a 
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The concept of "ideology" shares many common characteristics with 
that of "social class." Both terms are extremely important to sociology 
and to the social sciences and yet both terms share equally in their 
ambiguities and proneness to emotional involvement. Richard Centers 
comments on the latter concept: 
. social class identification is not now a para-
mount aspect of the thinking of most Americans; class 
is not a salient and vital aspect of their sense of 
identity.l 
Another social class example is that explained by Albert K. Cohen 
and Harold M. Hodges, Jr. who describe a "lower-blue-collar" social 
class as being a conglomeration of such characteristics as "extra 
punitiveness," "simplification of the experience world," "powerless-
ness," "deprivation" and "insecurity," "anti-intellectualism," and 
"authoritarianism." A closer look at this cluster of variables is 
interpreted via role playing: 
.•. role relationships are more likely for the (lbc)* 
to be defined in terms of somebody responsible for 
making decisions and giving orders, and somebody respon-
sible for carrying them out • • • the decisive question 
in "real life" situation is • "Who's boss?"2 
The ideological position appears to be even more elusive than that 




for its support and justification. This problem is touched on by Ernst 
Cassirer who has written: 
. what became more important for the general history 
of ideas and for the development of philosophical thought 
was not the empirical facts of evolution but the theoreti-
cal interpretation of these facts.3 
There are, perhaps, some observers of our society who believe 
that American Sociology is the rough equivalent of the British Fabian 
Society; they would be in for a disappointment of major proportions. 
If any one term depicts the essential ideological posture and orienta-
tion of American Sociology, it would be non-political subsumed under a 
complex web of terminology complimentary to what is sometimes ref erred 
to as the "establishment syndrome," or "liberal capitalism," or a crude 
rationale of "laissez faire," "captain of industry" mythology centering 
around anti-collectivism or extreme individualism. This amorphous 
conservatism is no accident; it has many antecedents which may easily 
be detected. 
Among the highlights of the conservative matrix which has been 
modern sociology's heritage are the combined happenings in response to 
the French Revolution. Society is an organic entity and is prior to 
the individual. Society is not reducible to individuals. Each individ-
ual and each social trait are parts of a system which is maintained by 
needs. Next is the significance of function in society in which the 
small group is the basic unit of society. The recognition of social 
disorganization is viewed in opposition to the sacred values of the 
society. Last, the legitimation of authority is manifested in a chain 
4 which links family, community, class and society together. 
A point of some confusion is when "social class'' and "ideology" 
are compounded into a more general concept than that discussed above. 
One finds some comfort in going along with the generality engendered 
by the following question and accompanying answer: 
Why and how do the oppressed and the exploited chal-
lenge those who dog it and hog it? Since man's 
invention of private property and the state, a small 
minority of persons have declared their commitment 
to coerce a majority and to justify minority use of 
force in the name of a common good.5 
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However, "social class" and "ideology" are combined in the conser-
vative manifesto as depicted above by Nisbet. This being the case one 
can see the extreme conservative side of traditional American Sociology 
where, in some respects,it is still fashionable to refer to "organic 
society" (if not "organic solidarity") and where "social disorganiza-
tion" (more likely, "deviance") may be referred to from the point of 
view of "structural defects" (let alone such declarations as "anomie" 
or "labeling theory") and where "social system" becomes the model for 
everything that can be socially reified. Last, in this context, the 
position of authority remains paramount despite an erosion and corrup-
tion on the part of politicans and their parties. One may seek and 
find ideological explanations for all components of the above system. 
More specifically, the conceptualization needed at this juncture 
is stated by John c. Leggett as follows: 
. • • we do make a distinction between ideology and 
utopia, between, in effect, obfuscation and hope. 
States depend on ideologies to foster legitimation, 
but political movements--especially the more militant 
variety--espouse utopias. Ideologies refer to idea 
systems that purport to portray reality, although gen-
erally they obscure it. Ideologies may be specific or 
qen< 't"a 1. 6 
A more delicate if not sophisticated aspect of this critical 
phenomenon is viewed by David Braybrooke who states: 
Ideology constitutes a predicament more insidious than 
the universal liability of mankind to personal prejudice. 
Social scientists can correct each other on points of 
personal prejudice, in which one man deviates from his 
colleagues--but how can they correct for a pervasive 
bias that all may share, because they belong to a given 
society and enjoy similar privileges within it?7 
Going full cycle, in effect, going beyond the normal, ambiguous 
parameters of ideology, Ivan Chapman has pointed out: 
Ideological control is concerned with power of a suffi-
cient magnitude to be able to predict how people will 
act. This means power of the magnitude necessary to 
establish the definition of the situation as the only 
basis for social action by some single construction of 
reality and thereby excision and repression of all other 
methods of human construction of reality.a 
It is the Chapman position which, from a sociological position, 
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suggests the most fruitful, if not deceitful, realization about society 
in general, that there are some social "forms and fragments," both 
manifest and latent, that are part of a "secret order" of things 
relating to power if not coercion. These forms and fragments, although 
masking as legitimate and for the good of all, are, in effect, con-
trived systems which are purposive for certain interest groups. This, 
in some ways, reflects the teaching of an enlightened C. Wright Mills 
whose position will be explained below. One may also include a masking 
and insightful remark from Coser at this point. It is Coser's position 
that, "Literature, though it may also be many other things, is social 
evidence and testimony. 119 
Thus, it may be stated by way of generalization that there is a 
continuum which may be detected in ideological statements which range 
between the diffused and the particular but that the implications of 
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the former may be as important as those of the latter. One may also 
detect a whole gamut of economic and political ideologies as will be 
discussed in full below. Last, there is what may be classified as the 
historical dimension of ideology and this, particularly when stated in 
any degree of causality, is most deceiving for there are questions to 
be raised when hearing about the Middle Ages or the Colonial Period 
or even when citing an example of preliterate society in the contem-
porary world order. These questions are concerned with the nature of 
"social class," "elite position," "morality," and should also include 
"social change" and "legitimacy." 
Ideologies, then, are more than concepts. It is true that they 
may be related to social class and to the "accident of history" or 
historical factors. It is also true that they may be rooted in a 
social class concept of and defense of power which is grounded in both 
economic and political considerations. But, ideologies are decidedly 
interwined with theories, propositions, assumptions, frames of refer-
ence, hypotheses, and, indeed, whole disciplines as well as doctrines 
and philosophies. 
One may cite the field of political science as being prone to 
acceptance of the operationalized ideology of democracy. Economics in 
our society is largely the task of rationalization of contemporary 
corporate capitalism. Sociology as depicted by Parsons and his school 
is a grand theory justification and rationale of the social action 
components and institutions of a lifeless, rational, leaderless, non-
human society. At a lower level of analysis, again citing contemporary 
American sociology, a good sociological study is one which has a 
firmed up, believable and testable hypothesis, a good "research design," 
a sufficient size of sample from a population or universe, and a test 
which holds true at the five per cent level or one which will be true 
95 per cent of the time. 
Ideologies may be compared to social classes as indicated above. 
They may also be compared to the popular sociological concepts of 
"alienation" and "anomie." Both of these terms have independent 
histories, schools, theories and ideologies of their own, the former 
being traced to Marx and the latter to Durkheim. In fact, one may 
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go a step farther with both terms and say that they are, in effect, 
personifications of ideologies within themselves, or, at least fragments 
thereof. An explanation is in order. For the Marxian position, "alien-
ation" is but a state of being for the proletariat under capitalism, a 
state of existence which robs the workers not only of economic rewards 
but also of dignity in association with his fellow man. One might also 
project that the bourgeoise, the owners of the means of production, also 
experience a form of "alienation" in that their greed for profits, 
their strongest motivating force, does not allow them to live in a world 
where social relations can be normal and human. Thus, the capitalist 
digs his own grave, both individually and collectively, and the "class-
less society" lies just beyond the rugged mountains of "class conscious-
ness," "class struggle," "revolution," "dictatorship of the proletariat" 
and the "classless so.ciety." Alienation or the separation of self from 
society as well as estrangement between men is a negative ideology 
designed to speed up the processes of social and cultural change. But, 
the real contradiction is that it is relatively permanent in either a 
pre or post capitalist society; hence, it is studied as something to be 
alleviated if not abolished altogether. Nevertheless, it is much more 
a product of Marxian dialectics and is an ideological tool of the 
left. 
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Anomie, explained by Durkheim as a state of normlessness exper-
ienced by some individuals in organic society (as opposed to mechanistic 
society) may result in suicide. The individual experiences sudden 
change and is not able to cope with the situation. One may suddenly 
inherit great wealth. This, in itself, appears on the surface to be 
no problem, but it might be a critical problem for one who has always 
experienced poverty. Or, one may suddenly lose all of one's wealth 
which would pose no problem to some but to those who have always had 
wealth, it would be a serious challenge. Could a member of the Rocke-
feller family adjust to a minimum level Social Security retirement 
program? The answer to this could only be "anomie." Thus, the ideo-
logical manifestations of this concept are most viable. The major 
difference between "alienation" and "anomie" is structural in that the 
former lays blame to the social order or social system whereas the 
latter sees the individual being at fault in his inability to make 
needed adjustments. The former may be called "radical"; the latter 
"conservative." 
It may be said, without reservation, that the popularity of a 
concept has little to do with its reliability. A phrase su.ch as 
"survival of the fittest," for example, with all of its overtones of 
Social Darwinism, is not necessarily as scientific as it is metaphysical 
and ideological. In a similar manner the same is true of the concepts 
"alienation" and "anomie." It would be difficult, however, to envision 
the discipline of sociology minus these two terms since they are both 
centers of considerable research of a high order despite the recent 
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addition of social-psychological imputation for purposes of scaling 
and operationalism. 
By means of a sociology of knowledge frame of reference as will 
be discussed below, the concept of ideology itself takes on new meanings 
some of which are imputations of a philosophical and historical nature. 
This is legitimate and it is a type of theoretical common expectation 
or norm. What is more difficult to see, however, is the line between 
that which is empirical and that which is metaphysical. There is no 
one way to do this. Thus, ideology is a concept which should be recog-
nized as straddling the margin between science and folk belief. A 
comment on the work of Karl Popper is of some assistance here: 
Hence Popper says that it is wrong to begin by accumu-
lating observations, and it is wrong to seek confirming 
instances of a theory. Instead we should advance bold 
conjectures--derived from intuition, or creative genius, 
or any way we like--and attempt to refute them. Of 
two competing theories, the one that has run the 
greater risk of falsification, but has not been 
falsified, is the better corroborated. This does not 
mean that it is true--it may be falsified in the future--
but it is likely to be a closer approximation to the 
truth than its rival. We can never, in science, know 
that we have discovered the truth; although there is 
such a thing as truth, it is a regulative idea which we 
try to approach, but can never be sure of reaching.10 
Thus, if folk belief is to be considered as a logical and legiti-
mate dimension of ideology (and it certainly should be considered in 
this light), it opens a whole new approach to the concept of truth in 
the social sciences. This is the case because of the awareness that 
ideology is linked in no uncertain terms to such phenomena as myths, 
legends, folklore, sagas and theology. Looking within most schemes of 
rationalization in regards to race relations, religious bigotry, 
inferior education, poverty and war, one finds that ideology via myth 
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invariably rears its head. One might select a special case in regards 
to the rationale of science. Could it be anything but a particular 
kind of magic which makes all of these wonders of sight, sound and body 
comfort possible? In addition to this question, could it not, in some 
small way, be nothing more than the "magic of nationalism?" A lesson 
in ancient history has interesting implications: 
Roman science appears at its best in the depart-
ment of "Nature Study" and at its weakest in "Pure 
Mathematics." The success or failure of the Romans 
in any scientific field may be roughly gauged by its 
nearness to one or other of these disciplines. The 
gauge must be biased, however, by the Roman desire 
for "useful studies." There was for instance . 
a special development in certain departments of 
Geography.11 
The above leads one to believe that what may have been labelled 
science in the ancient world would have little resemblance to that which 
is designated as science today. Before there could be science there had 
to be a cross-fertilization of ideas and traditions. In other words, 
there had to be a change in "ideologies" (in this case, specifically, 
belief systems) in order for this to occur. This took a great deal of 
time to happen, much beyond the parameters of what is usually designated 
the "ancient period": 
"Science and the opinion of the mob," says Pliny, are 
in direct opposition. According to the former the 
whole sphere of the earth is inhabited by men whose 
feet point towards each other while all have the heavens 
above their heads. But the mob ask how men on the anti-
podes do not fall off; as though that did not present 
the opposite query why they should not wonder at ~ not 
falling off. Usually, however, the crowd objects if one 
urges that water also tends to be spherical. Yet nothing 
is more obvious, since hanging drops always form little 
spheres. Among his proofs of the curved surface of the 
earth is the gradual appearance of ships, mast first, 
t·hen hull, as they approach the shore .12 
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The simplicity of the above is almost unreal and yet it is an 
attempt to build and devise science only with observation of concrete 
reality devoid of abstraction and symbols or sets and systems thereof 
(mathematics). Thus, the cross-fertilization or bending and blending 
of ideologies of science awaited later historical and cultural accidents: 
. . • the important event in the history of science in 
the Middle Ages is the arrival of the Arabian learning. 
It was the Arabian influence that finally set the 
intellect of Western Europe on the high road to the 
Renaissance. 13 
Thus, to speculate on the nature of ideology in the ancient world 
and into the later middle ages may appear to be a dismal and unrewarding 
activity. This may be true from the point of view of history and tech-
nology, but it is most illuminating from the point of view of ideology 
and culture. One may ask, whose ideology and whose culture? In 
response the most logical response is to stipulate that the acceptance 
of science meant the general consensus or agreement to do things in 
another fashion--handicrafts, navigation, agriculture, religion, war, 
dominance, aesthetics, and in a broad way, social organization (family 
life, community life, communication, transportation, trade). 
It is also stimulating if not somewhat startling to know where 
science came from. The response to this is that it came from the most 
totalitarian societies (Arabian) extant in the ancient world, survivals 
of which had greatly deteriorated in the middle ages. Thus, by calling 
it discipline or whatever one wishes in this context, the politics of 
science is rigid. The same can be said for the politics of theology. 
It may well be that the ideological split caused by this old confronta-
tion has produced, as the Freudian School may symbolize, a schizophrenic 
society. Looking at France in the 19th Century, a Napoleon, a 
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Pasteur, and a Durkheim were produced, all within a relatively 
few decades of one another, each acting out and being strongly influ-
enced to some degree by the ideological confrontation described above: 
Napoleon using the greater terror of modern firearms and a well 
disciplined army; Pasteur attempting to isolate bacteria and usherihg 
in the germ theory of medicine; and Durkheim attuned to the cohesion 
or lack of such in an organic model of society and reaching back to the 
corporate structure of the Holy Roman Empire and the Catholic Church 
for some semblance of resolution in the crisis of modern man. 
Thus, the "crisis of modern man" may well serve as the nexus and 
fulcrum of ideological discourse. It is one thing to define the 
concept; it is much more of a challenge to explain, if only in part, 
the implications. One general definition is as follows: 
Ideologies are made up of cognitive and affective 
judgments about what elements are important in social 
life, the reasons these are important, the way in 
which social processes actually work, and the ways in 
which all or part of the social system ought to change. 
Generally, ideologies are well formulated and readily 
identifiable with regard to major issues and basic 
institutions in society; they are not as well formu-
lated and readily identifiable with regard to minor 
issues and social structures.14 
It may be a point of argumentation to accept the latter part of 
the above definition concerning the fact that minor issues are not as 
well formulated, ideologically, as major, institutional issues. One 
would have to deliberate quite at iength to stipulate that "racism," 
"anti-semitism" and "McCarthyism" have been minor issues. One would 
have to search for satisfactory explanations for voter negativism, 
anti-union practices and bl,ind faith in pseudo-patriotic organizations. 
In brief, one would be prone to search deeply into the structure and 
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causality of social movements in general. Not only that, one would be 
prone to search deeply into the present composition of existing ideo-
logies to challenge whether or not large, multi-national corporations 
represent an objective "freedom of enterprise" and if lobbying in 
Washington, D. C. and fifty state capitols is compatible with our free 
democratic institutions. One may come to the realization that there is 
a matter of false representation and that, in actuality, those ideo-
logies which have been sustained by special interests are little more 
than ploys or modern "Roman bread and circuses" designed to insure a 
smooth transition of political and economic power from one generation 
to the next. 
A more concrete explanation for ideology is that which is offered 
by Blumberg who raises an interesting legal question and suggests an 
interesting explanation: 
How then can the court's functionaries and the clients 
it serves continue to defend as legitimate such a 
negatively evaluated, oppressive social arrangement? 
Partly the answer lies in the concept of ideology--
the fact that "man does not live by bread al~ne," that 
he must seek to develop an ideology to justify, rein-
force, and give meaning to interests he pursues. These 
ideologies and their elaborate rationales become as 
real and consequential as the material interests. 
Ideologies need not be and often are not the weapons 
of a conspiracy of rulers to keep the ruled submerged 
or to falsify a given state of affairs. On the con-
trary, they are often nurtured and subscribed to by 
all strata, rulers and ruled alike, and to resolve the 
inevitable disordancies and incompatibilities of belief 
systems.15 
There appear to be some weak underpinnings in the substance of 
the above policy statement on an ideology of justice and jurisprudence. 
One should not decry the reality of sophisticated manipulation, 
persuasion and influence. Blumberg himself is aware of two 
"suppositions" or universal beliefs for both the accused and his 
accuser: 
(1) A defendent in a criminal court is realiy beaten 
by the deprivations and limitations imposed by his 
social class, race, and ethnicity. (2) ••. the 
ameliorative--therapeutic model of the court, the 
origin of which is to be found in the Positivist 
school of criminology and serves to cast the crimi-
nal in the role of a "sick" person.16 
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The problem with the Blumberg argument is that it is both true in 
some respects and false in others. The fact of the matter is simply 
that the going social institutions are constantly being reinforced by 
various means of propagandistic techniques. This may amount to a 
"Veterans' Day" parade, a television broadcast featuring the F.B.I., a 
"commercial message" via the mass media reminding us to be good savers 
in building and loan organizations or banks and also reminding us to 
use the proper underarm deodorant and detergent soap powder so that 
our best foot or arm can be put forward with complete self-satisfaction 
and self-confidence. An interesting observation which is made by 
Silver is that, " .•• 'crime,' 'the criminal,' and other concepts 
. . . are defined by the political organization of society . • . • Law 
17 is the creation of a political process." 
Thus, what Blumberg denies and Silver infers is emphatically 
implied by Wolfe whose contention is that ideologies in support of 
present institutional values may be seen as instruments of repression. 
His approach is as follows: 
Direct ideological repression involves both a direct 
attack on potential competing ideologies--such as a 
return to the free market from the Right or socialism 
from the Left--as well as a continued defense of the 
existing ideology of corporate liberalism.18 
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The above author continues with a question followed by a meaningful 
answer: 
Do those who are engaged in ideological repression know 
what they are doing? In the twentieth century, those 
who hold power in liberal democracies have come to 
realize the importance of ideology. Acceptance of re-
ceived ways of thinking, it has been found, is not 
accidental but has to be worked at. This need has 
given rise to a group of experts at ideological 
indoctrination •... 19 
Whether or not "repression" is the proper term, there are cer-
tainly a great number of expressions which fit into the frame of 
reference as suggested by Wolfe: 
(1) What's good for G.M. is good for America. 
(2) Love it or leave it. 
(3) 100 Per Cent American 
(4) Freedom of Enterprize 
(5) Constitutional Constructionist. 
Terms which are counter to the establishment are: 




(5) Nigger Lovers4 
The point to be made between these two groups of ideological 
expressions is an important one. As long as one goes with the grain 
of "motherhood," "apple pie" and "democracy," there is nothing to worry 
about. However, as one deviates from the "line," meaning the "estab-
lishment," there is cause for alarm, and there are self-appointed 
"gate keeper" organizations such as the American Legion and the John 
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Birch Society which act as watchdogs of the faithful. This is not to 
deprive the FBI and the CIA as well as many other "official" agencies 
including the IRS of their role as guardians of democracy. What is 
important for purposes of this discussion is that keepers of the faith 
in the establishment are "idealists." Those who in any remote or 
critical sense are opposed to present policies and who wish to realize 
social change are considered the "ideologists" or bearers of "foreign 
ideologies." 
One notes, for example, a play on opposites which is not neces-
sarily a dialectic as much as it is a position of negative coercion 
towards any infringement upon present policies. Thus, if you are not 
convinced that "capitalism" and "free markets" are the best economic 
systems for everyone, you are a "communist" or "socialist"--no particu-
lar distinction is necessary. For one to advocate vigorous programs 
of ecological safeguards via pollution control could also be inter-
preted as anti-capitalist, hence, "ideological." The same argument 
could be anticipated in regards to "labor unions," "unemployment," 
and "economic recession." 
To be labeled a communist can have and has had the most serious 
consequences. This is the ideology considered to be most foreign to 
our "way of life." Lazarsfeld and Thielens who investigated this 
problem in the late 1950's had this to say about such impact: 
During the post-war years the college incidents which 
most frequently made newspaper headlines were those 
in which professors were charged with Communist Party 
affiliations.20 
Some of the above activity has been designated as "witch hunting" 
and there are many reports that merely being suspect of harboring 
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communist sympathies is tantamount to "guilt by association." It would 
be interesting to replicate the Lazarsfeld and Thielens research in 
view of more recent developments such as the Civil Rights Movement and 
the United States involvement in Vietnam. One is reminded of the 
ideological designation of congressmen and senators during the recent 
war in which their voting records were equated into "doves" and "hawks" 
with much more popular press notices attributed to the latter than the 
former. Thus, for some reason or other, it simply was not patriotic 
to be opposed to the war as unpopular and devastating as this episode 
has proved to be. There is, then, within this discourse on ideology 
an interesting statement by Birnbaum who states: "American society, 
then, lacks the ideological resources to make a correct estimate of 
its historical situation. 1121 It is his position that: 
. . . the fragmentation of class struggle in America, 
the ethnic diversity of the population, have contri-
buted to the prevention of a true cultural homogenization 
of the population. The homogenization which has now 
taken place is rather an imposed one and not necessarily 
an entirely profound one.22 
Thus, the study of ideology is a complex one sharing some charac-
teristics with concepts such as "social class," "alienation," and 
"anomie." It is the ideology of a people which directs its social 
action. It is a counter ideology which is a sign that there are telling 
imperfections within the social order. Many years ago the concept 
"marginal man" was employed by Robert Ezra Park and others to describe 
the plight of immigrants straddling both an old and new world culture. 
Although this concept is not in vogue today, one may give it new 
vitalization by hypothesizing that there are many who live in two (if 
not more) ideological worlds: (1) reality of the present; (2) hopes 
17 
for a better future; and, perhaps, (3) a recognition that only drastic 
changes can usher in the "good life." 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The classic study in the area of "ideology" and the "sociology of 
knowledge" is Karl Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia. 1 This particular 
work is, for the most part, rooted in the Marxian tradition. For Wolfe, 
the two basic antecedents of the sociology of knowledge are to be found 
in the works of Marx and Durkheim. Mannheim's work is, in many res-
pects, the acknowledged classic in the field. 
In order to demonstrate the erudite coverage of the subject, one 
finds in his extensive bibliography the following organization: 
I. Epistemological Aspects of the Social Sciences 
1. Presuppositions 
2. Bias and Perspective 
3. Objectivity 
4. Symbols, Meaning, Communication, and Language 
5. Evaluative and Non-Evaluative Social Science 
6. Historicism 
7. Generalizations 
II. Social Movements and Intellectual Life 
1. Ideas and Ideologies 
2. Utopian Mentality 




(1) the distinction between the "particular," the "total" 
and the "general" concepts of ideology 
(a) ideology as constituting only a segment of an 
opponent's thought 
(b) ideology as constituting the whole of an opponent's 
thought (the "false consciousness" of Marxism) 
(c) ideology as characteristic both of the opponent's as 
well as one's own thought 
(2) upon reaching the "general" level (le), the sociology of 
knowledge is reached 
(a) no human thought is free from the influence of the 
ideology of its social context 
(3) the theory of ideology is the general problem of: 
(a) epistemology 
(b) historical sociology 
(4) the task of the sociology of knowledge: 
(a) ideology can never be completely eradicated 
(b) systematic analysis of ideology is necessary. 20 
The above may be evaluated not only as an endorsement of Mannheim's 
position but also an attempt to systematize his sometimes fragmented 
thinking on the subject of ideology and the sociology of knowledge. 
The same may be said when these writers declare: "The sociology of 
knowledge must concern itself with everything that passes for 'know-
d I • • ,,21 le ge in society. 
This position is taken in view of the fact that only a small 
number of persons in any society will be engaged in theorizing, but 
common place ideas and knowledge are shared by all members of society; 
30 
hence, only by exploring this fabric of meanings can a social construe-
tion of reality be made possible. One gathers from this premise that 
it is every bit as important for the sociologist to know and under-
stand folklore and conunon sense beliefs as it is to know scientific 
principles. It is also of interest to recall that Sumner had a great 
deal more in mind than is customarily attributed to him when he pro-
nounced that "folkways are always the right ways." 
Reality for Berger and Luckmann is nothing more than the happenings 
of everyday life. Their method of analysis is what may be termed 
phenomenological. They explain their position as follows: 
The phenomenological analysis of everyday life, or rather 
of the subjective experience of everyday life, refrains 
from any causal or genetic hypotheses, as well as from 
assertions about the ontological status of the phenomena 
analyzed. 22 
In establishing the above position these authors assume that con-
sciousness is always intentional and everyday happenings may be of both 
a routine as well as a specific variety. They infer, for example, 
that "the world of everyday life is structured both spatially and 
23 
temporally." Some of the characteristics of everyday happenings are 
not too much unlike explanations offered by exchange theory. Such 
terms as "negotiation" imply an ongoing confrontation between designated 
individuals typifying multivariate value schemes and symbols. The 
24 basis for the exchange of everyday life is always social structure • 
. Language is given a relatively high position in the scheme devised 
by Berger and Luckmann. Not only are vocal signs seen as significant 
for· carrying on the discourse and conununication of society, but, more 
emphatically, they relate that, " .•• men must talk about themselves 
25 
until they know themselves." 
31 
In rounding out the subjective approach these authors point out 
that, " ••• the reality of everyday life always appears as a zone of 
26 
lucidity behind which there is a background of darkness." Their 
discourse is also concerned with what they call the distribution of 
knowledge which has obvious social class implications. They also 
lean towards a pragmatic interpretation of knowledge which for them is 
likened to a recipe or "knowledge limited to pragmatic competence in 
27 
routine performances." They offer as a prime example the use of the 
telephone in everyday life. An important summary statement is offered 
as follows: 
In everyday life I know • • • what I can hide from whom, 
whom I can turn to for information on what I do not 
know, and generally which types of individuals may be 
expected to have which types of knowledge.28 
In their approach to objective reality the above authors present 
a biological and envirorunental model of man which is quite flexible 
and capable of almost anything in regards to where and how he lives 
including his sexual interests and activities. They infer, for example, 
that "just as it is impossible for man to develop as man in isolation, 
so it is impossible for man in isolation to produce a human environ-
29 
ment." The proper formula for human existence must include order, 
direction and stability. A compromise position is noted on biological 
factors when they exclaim: " ••• although no existing social order 
can be derived from biological data, the necessity for social order as 
such stems from man's biological equipment. 1130 
From this point the writers build their case for both institution-
alization and objective reality. The individual sees himself through 
his own "biography" or "personal history" via externalization through 
32 
interaction and value systems. A more detailed explanation i~ offl'rt~d 
as follows: II • the relationship between man, the producer, and the 
social world, his product, is and remains a dialectical one • . . . Man 
31 
and his social world interact with each other." 




Society is a human product. 
Society is an objective reality. 
32 
Man is a social product. 
Rounding out the theory the authors state that, " •.• only with 
the appearance of a new generation can one properly speak of a social 
33 
world." 
The institutionalized frame of reference provides the setting in 
which the above interaction takes place. Children are taught to behave 
properly. Adults are conditioned to exhibit the correct measure of 
motivation in a society. "The more conduct is institutionalized, the 
. 34 
more predictable and thus the more controlled it becomes." Exper-
iences retained in consciousness are referred to as sedimented. 35 The 
end product of this process is explained as follows: "The objectivated 
meanings of institutional activity are conceived of as 'knowledge' and 
36 
transmitted as such." 
Berger and Luckmann introduce explanations for role playing as 
well as modes of institutionalization. An unusual example is offered 
concerning Jews. They are initiated into social science by an awareness 
of their problem as Jews, a distinct minority group. Yet, once they 
become social scientists, they are expected to adapt a role of neutrality 
or objectivity in both their studies and their social relationships. 
34 
might say that it represents a "coming of age" or maturity of sociology 
which has relied for such a long period on operationalism and micro-
sociological techniques. 
A complementary adjunct to the above study is the work of Chapman. 
In his first study this writer sets out to exercise the reality 
construction prerogative. 39 Chapman explores various fonns of reality 
structuring including linguistic, scientific, mythical, magical, 
religious, dialectical and conceptual. He then proceeds to outline 
what he designates as the sociological task. 
Beginning with the latter chapter the author declares that the 
sociologist has a commitment to understand man's social nature and 
that this cannot be accomplished by mathematical formulation alone. 
It is his view that, "Social science is concerned with all human con-
structions of reality. 1140 More particularly, then, Chapman states, 
"The sociological approach • • • must encompass all existing social 
41 structures." 
What stands in the way of achieving the goal of understanding? 
The following are suggestions: 
(1) the prevalence of "scientific escapism" 
(2) the substitution of individual for world understanding 
(3) the stress on rational progression rather than reality 
(4) the prevalence of psychosis in current thought fonns 
(5) the tendency towards rational reductionism 
(6) the decline in the freedom of inquiry 
(7) the suppression of free inquiry 
(8) the danger of an ideologically prescribed psychosis. 42 
controversy he exclaims: "The ideal thought form of distinct and 
separate categories is alien to the existential world of reality. 1145 
This rationale is continued more in detail as follows: 
In cases where we have the power to manipulate people 
to the extent that they fit our categories, we have 
deserted the scientific spirit, quest, and method and 
have resorted to a crude ideological manipulation of 
people. 46 
Mythisviewed as a method of structuring social reality. Myth 
is noted as a universal means of explaining reality. Chapman sees 
36 
the soft sciences (social) as being subjected to adhering to the mythol-
ogy of the hard sciences (physical). In a general sense this is 
explained as follows: 
All persons in today's urban, industrial, technological 
society need a closer touch with reality and reality 
structuring than the mathematical, precise, rational 
constructs which are forced upon them today.47 
Other important insights offered by this writer are: 
(1) the misunderstanding in regards to magic, that it may even 
l 'f . 48 qua i y as a true science 
(2) that religion presents many unsolved problems which have 
not as yet been resolved by science49 
(3) that dialectical explanations dichotomize both social 
reality as well as human beings . 50 
Looking into the future, Chapman sees the role of reality con-
struction under most optimum conditions. He points out that: 
Society's responsibility is to free the individual so that 
he can by means of social distance and personal thought 
define the situation for social action • . • . In this 
manner society can be an on-going, adaptive process of 
reciprocal thought and action at the individual level and 
at the group leve1.Sl 
The second work by Chapman continues to explore "ideological 
confusion" via what may be termed "schools of ideology. 1152 This 
includes a close scrutiny of the Weberian Ideology, the Parsonian 
Ideology and a fusion of the two. An overview of th~ situation is 
offered as follows: 
Glorified rational systems . . • have no better record 
than glorified human beings; for rational systems by 
the logic of their own construction and inner working 
must destroy their adherents as human beings by reducing 
them to rational men, actors, and role-players, and 
finally to mechanistic bits and pieces to be used for 
the system needs.53 
In this study Chapman sets out to demonstrate that reality for 
the average person is greatly distorted. We are "brain washed" to a 
large degree by a rational scheme which does not have a great deal of 
consideration for the individual. ThE? author exclaims: "The person 
37 
is thus reduced to stimulus-response, pain-avoidance activity, directed 
b I I ' ' f , d ,.54 y an external other in the interest o some rational system nee • 
A critique of Max Weber indicates that he is concerned with a 
continuation of the mutilation. Thus, the ideology of profit and the 
ideal of power via the instrumentality of bureaucracy is recognized by 
Chapman to be oppressive. In brief, Weber's rationale represents a 
complete break with the social world. 55 The essence of the Weberian 
reductionism scheme is viewed by Chapman as explaining Protestantism 
as a scheme for accumulating profits. 56 Thus, the functions of social 
institutions, in a general sense, have been altered from a life-giving 
function to one of serving the needs of power and profit. 
Chapman sees the ideological constructs of Talcott Parsons as 
being an outgrowth as well as a more intensive model of the Weberian 
scheme. He explains the "social system" of Parsons as follows: 
• • • the "social system" is an imposed scheme in that it 
does not grow out of social action but grows as an out-
side rational scheme which is imposed upon the personal, 
social, and cultural components as an anthropomorphic 
integrator of these strictly social elements. Person and 
society are reduced by a rational scheme to a rational 
scheme • • • • All that is human or social is lost by 
being reduc59 to symbols and treated thereafter totally 
as symbols. 
Chapman carries his critique of Parsons a step further when he 
exclaims: 
(1) Social action systems are ideological systems designed for 
purposes of manipulation and repression. 
(2) Ideology and mass media aid social action in transforming 
58 
interacting people into rational symbols. 
A strong sununary statement is offered by Chapman: 
The Parsonian-Weberian system is a system based upon 
force which is used to insure a supply for the rationally 
constructed needs of a rationally constructed system 
not based upon the nature of man nor upon the nature and 
needs of society.59 
What Chapman sees as imperative is a re-evaluation of the works 
38 
of Mead, Thomas and James so that the ideological interpretations made 
by students of Parsons can be acknowledged for what they are--distor-
tions. One prime example of this is the way in which the "definition 
of the social situation" introduced by Thomas becomes the "self-
fulfilling prophecy" of Merton. In a note of finality Chapman states: 
The Parsonian ideological rational scheme with power and 
unearned social influence reduces persons and groups to 
system maintenance needs and collapses the basic social 
institutions upon which man's survival depends.60 
Since this chapter began with Mannheim, it will serve many 
purposes of logic to conclude with him. The recent work edited by 
Wolff is that which will be examined. 61 In this work the editor warns 
39 
of the constant potential for misstatement and misunderstanding in 
translating from the German to the English language. Subjects covered 
by Mannheim include a critique of Georg Lukacs as well as an explana-
tion of Weltanschauung. More central to this study is what Mannheim 
labels the problem of the sociology of knowledge and the ideological 
and sociological interpretation of intellectual phenomena. 
It is Wolff's contention that the mainstream of Mannheim's work 
lies in "the problem of how to go about interpreting intellectual or 
62 
spiritual phenomena." Keen insight is exhibited by Mannheim in the 
following: 
achieving from time to time a certain distance from 
his own situation and from the world is one of the funda-
mental traits of man as a truly human being. A man for 
whom nothing exists beyond his immediate situation is not 
fully human. 63 
The subject of "meaning" is important to Mannheim, if not central 
to his theory of knowledge. Wolff concludes that there are, essentially, 
three kinds of understanding: 
(1) objective meaning - that which is given immediately 
(2) expressive meaning - mediated 
(3) documentary meaning - mediated. 64 
All of the above have relevance for science and the arts in 
different historical contexts. Mannheim is also interested in episte-
mology which he places into the following three categories: 
(1) the known (knowledge or cognition) 
(2) the knower (subject) 
(3) the to-be-known (object).65 
What is of paramount concern for Mannheim is to bridge the corre-
lations between the three elements to gain a more genuine perspective 
40 
on reality. One important statement here is that," •.. history of 
ideas becomes sociology of knowledge if it undertakes its investigation 
66 
with due regard for social strata." 
An example of sociology of knowledge application to conservatism 
and liberalism is offered as follows: 
For the conservative the picture of things as a whole is 
inclusive and detailed; for the progressive it is more 
like a rough blueprint or groundplan. For the conserva-
tive the present is the last stage of the past, for 
liberalism the beginning of the future.67 
Commenting further on this dichotomy Mannheim states: 
Revolutionary thought derives its force from the desire 
to realize a rationally well-defined pattern of perfection 
of the social and political order. Conservative thought, 
opposed to the fulfillment of utopia, is forced to con-
sider why the actually existing state of society fails 
to correspond to such a rational pattern.68 
Turning briefly to what Mannheim labels the "problem" of the 
sociology of knowledge, this relates to a comparison between the exami-
nation of a cultural or intellectual problem and that of a mathematical 
problem. In the former there is no "sequence" which one may turn to; 
whereas in the latter, one problem may well lead to the solution of 
others. Thus, one searches for and develops a "constellation" of 
ideas. This will aid the scholar to determine whether or not a solu-
tion is possible. Mannheim comments as follows: 
Whereas in mathematics and natural science, progress 
seems to be determined to a large extent by immanent 
factors, one question leading up to another with a 
purely logical necessity, with interruptions due only 
to difficulties not yet solved, the history of cultural 
sciences shows such an "immanent" progress only for 
limited stretches.69 
Mannheim sees four essential factors to the sociology of knowledge. 
They are as follows: 
41 
(1) self-relativization of thought and knowledge 
(2) appearance of a new form of relativization introduced by 
the "unmasking" turn of mind 
(3) the emergence of a new system of reference 
(4) the desire to make this relativization tota1. 70 
The main task for the sociology of knowledge as explained by 
Mannheim " • consists in specifying, for each temporal cross-section 
of the historical process, the various systematic intellectual stand-
points on which the thinking of creative individuals and groups was 
71 based." It is Mannheim's contention that historicism has already 
made notable beginnings in this direction. This demonstrates the 
importance of both historical as well as cultural factors in developing 
a methodology for the sociology of knowledge. 
What follows is a close inspection of how Mannheim, in effect, 
has actually used the sociology of knowledge approach. After a close 
inspection of Mannheim which may be looked upon as the classical 
approach, a review of secondary sources and contemporary usages will 
be presented. This is done in view of the fact that ideology remains 
the single most important sociological concept which is used by some 
with complete abandon as to the significance of the term. 
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CHAPTER III 
A CRITIQUE OF MANNHEIM 
To critique Mannheim is not to denigrate him. Few sociologists in 
the twentieth century have been as productive in postulating theoretical 
time-frames and bridges to the past as has Mannheim. At the outset 
one may be generous in postulating the broad sweep and magnitude of 
this author. As Derek L. Phillips has said of him, "Mannheim holds 
that not only does the individual speak the language of his group, but 
he also thinks in the manner in which his group thinks. 111 On the 
negative side, Phillips points to the ambiguity of the Mannheim position. 
This bleak position is the result of confusion which exists in regards 
to facts, truth, and values. In a position which is not too distant 
from that of Durkheim, Mannheim sees "facts" as external to the actor. 
Phillips' summary statement is as follows: 
Mannheim is enormously sensitive to the influence of 
people's social positions on what they can perceive, 
what they define and accept as knowledge and truth, 2 
as well as their views, opinions, goals, and values. 
In many other respects, the orientation or system which the 
sociology of knowledge suggests becomes bogged down in statements of 
probability and rampant subjectivity. Mannheim seems to be aware of 
this as much as he is aware of history and what Marx was capable of 
doing with it. In a general sense, to borrow from the Marxian tradition, 
Mannheim does not see social action of the past restri.cted to any 
45 
46 
elite group. He is conscious of the pluralistic action of all groups. 
One suggestion which may be offered here is the view of Louis J. Halle 
who claims: "Ideological thinking, whether right or wrong, is norma-
tive thinking so sure of its own rightness as to be intolerant of 
dissent. 113 
Another source searching for meaning in Mannheim's work cites 
the work (in German) of Helmuth Plessner who pointed out that ideologi-
cal thought is essentially two things: (1) weapon and category and 
(2) political mean and sociological reality. 4 In an earlier part of 
this paper a critical evalution is made of Mannheim: 
[He] separated the concept of ideology from the context 
of social critique and developed his notion of the total 
concept of ideology: existential determination and 
lacking objectivity became identical • • • . [His] 
approach to ideology, in connection with Weber's rejec-
tion of value commitments in social inquiry, became the 
basis for most future research on ideology outside the 
5 Marxian tradition ••• 
Singelmann sees some differences and similarities between the ways 
that Marx and Mannheim perceived ideology. For the former the concept 
was rooted in the substantial doctrine of Hegel's philosophy, Feverbach's 
6 
anthropology and classical economic theory. Both see sociology as 
linked to history and both separate "ideology" from the "lie," in that 
the former is a theoretical concept whereas the latter is an ethical 
7 
construct. Another point is that for Marx ideology was a weapon of 
attack devised to discredit a social order dominated by the bourgeoise. 
For Mannheim, on the other hand, the concentration was "on the relation-
8 
ship between particular systems of thought and historical development." 
It is in its departure from the hard class consciousness of 
Marxism that Mannheim's relativism runs into serious trouble. Thus, 
47 
Mannheim and his followers are forced to accept all thought, no matter 
how trivial and inconsequential, as ideology. They questioned every-
thing and attacked nothing. Intellectual configurations exist through 
9 social change. 
Still another position on the relevance of Mannheim's contribution 
10 is that of Ivan Chapman. Chapman attacks the position of Mannheim 
not from the amount of deviation from Marxism but from the point of 
view of logic in that Mannheim does not do what he claims for his 
orientation. Chapman's statement is as follows: 
. • • his method is precisely to eliminate from considera-
tions in the make-up of "true" social knowledge "other" 
psychological propositions and inferences than his own 
object qualities ••• negating as false all other 
psychologically apprehended meaning as well as all con-
ventionally shared meaning.11 
Chapman's line of reasoning includes an evaluation of Mannheim's 
use of the "I" and the "me" derivitive of the School of Symbolic Inter-
action. In addition to this, it is stated: "Mannheim was uncertain 
about what constituted the proper base for the critical stance called 
12 for in his sociology of knowledge." Chapman summarizes his position 
as follows: 
Thus the sociology of knowledge, rather than being a 
method in the search for understanding, in Mannheim's 
usage became a method for imputing true social know-
ledge to "others" and "other societies. nl3 
This criticism of Mannheim suggests several different kinds of 
knowledge in contradistinction to Mannheim's one and only type of 
knowledge: 
(1) opinion knowledge 
(2) reason knowledge 








Chapman cites the seven classes of knowledge suggested by Scheler 
48 
which run the gamut from "least" artificial to "most" artificial. They 
are as follows: 
(1) myth and legend 
(2) folk knowledge 
(3) religious knowledge 
(4) mystical knowledge 
(5) philosophical - metaphysical knowledge 
(6) positive knowledge (mathematics, natural and cultural 
sciences) 
(7) technological knowledge. 15 
The interesting thing about the above classification is that all of 
the classes are subject to ideological properties and characteristics. 
Chapman is on the road to an important re-evaluation of the Mannheim 
prospectus. A definitive statement by him is as follows: 
Society as an ongoing process may produce, through the 
reciprocal interaction of individuals, many forms of 
knowledge which are then filled with content by these 
interacting individuals. Knowledge of this immediate 
social character may then be transmitted to the next 
generation or "others" as cultural forms of the a 
priori stock of social knowledge. 16 
Chapman's main displeasure with Mannheim is that he "theoretically 
17 
reduced valid knowledge to imputed knowledge." By the same token an 
orthodox Marxist writer, Arnest Kolman, sees the situation much in the 
same way: 
Most of our knowledge we did not acquire by our own 
observations or experiments. It is transmitted knowledge. 
It is based on perceptions, on sensual or visual observa-
tions, on notions of others, and on information communicated 
to us.18 
The above, although critical of Mannheim, actually takes little 
away from him as formulator and pioneer of the concept of ideology 
within the frame of reference of the sociology of knowledge. Most 
theories have combinations of both metaphysical and empirical compo~ 
nents. Marxism, for example, may be viewed in many ways as a utopian 
scheme which has much more imputed than real value. The important 
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thing is that few writers in the philosophical--historical--sociological 
area of ideology follow Mannheim too closely possibly because of the 
extreme rigidity of the rules. Most writers, then, define their terms 
and, usually, begin with their own definition of ideology. A fair 
representation of this phenomenon is as follows: 
By ideology • . . is meant here any intellectual structure 
consisting of: a set of beliefs about the conduct of 
life and the organization of society; a set of beliefs 
about man's nature and the world in which he lives; a 
claim that the two sets are interdependent; and a demand 
that those beliefs should be professed, and that claim 
conceded, by anyone who is to be considered a full member 
of a certain social group.19 
Again, to add depth to what may serve as a rather good operational 
definition of ideology, the same author explains: " .•. ideologies are 
always internally complex and often inconsistent: different people can 
and do draw different practical conclusions from tne same ideological 
. ,,20 
premises. 
Thus, in a sense to critique Mannheim is to add new dimensions to 
the concept. It is easy to say that Scheler's wqrk could have been the 
definitive study had it been translated in time. The important factor 
is that there is relativity and bridges of understanding between 
generations largely because of the early thrust of Mannheim's work. 
One should note also that this allows one to utilize a technique of 
Marxism without adhering to the Party Line. Last, it should be 
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stressed that with the inept sociological theory of recent generations, 
this technique and orientation allows one to depart from naked opera-
tional.ism with its fetish for measurement and labeling of independent, 
dependent and intervening variables. There is no 2 X 2 table that could 
ever hold the limitless factors associated with ideology and the 
sociology of knowledge. 
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CHAPTER IV 
MAINSTREAM MATERIALS 
In most instances the student who is exposed to ideology as a 
concept and the sociology of knowledge as a sub-discipline specializa-
tion will become conditioned by the textbook materials selected by his 
or her sociology instructor. This chapter deals with such a situation 
and such materials, namely, Edward Shils' "The Concept and Function of 
1 
Ideology" and James E. Curtis and John w. Petras, editors, The 
2 
_S_o_c_i_·o~l_o~g~y~o_f~_K_n_o_w_l_e_d_,.g_e_:~-A~_R_e_a_d_e_r_. An earlier work which may also be 
3 
evaluated is that by Jacques J. Maquet. 
Beginning with the work of Shils one becomes somewhat aware that 
there are two principles involved in his approach to ideology: 
(1) a departure from what he refers to as the European tradition, 
namely the writings of Marx and Mannheim 
(2) a general tendency to attempt some operational conceptualiza-
tion within the broad category of the area of ideology. 
The above approach is not completely negative, but it must be pointed 
out here that some distortion is noted. What this indicates is quite 
simple. Either one discusses "ideology" or one does not discuss 
"ideology." There is nothing wrong with attempting to build or generate 
theory and methods from ideological constructs, but it may end up as 




What Shils does contribute, however, are some concepts which may 
have limited utility for future research. Those which are most meaning-
ful are as follows: 
a. "ideological primary groups"--the group which establishes 
a new ideological tradition 
b. "proto-ideological primary groups"--that group or gang 
which has an inadequate conception of society, hence an 
inadequate mode for changing it 
c. "charismatic ideology"--that ideology can and may be the 
creation of the vision of a charismatic leader. 
Much of the standard material is reviewed by Shils who sees ideo-
logy as an attempt to create intellectual order in the universe. The 
debate on truth and falsification is aired as well as the heritage of 
ideology in its comparison with science. There is also a brief summary 
of the "end of ideology" controversy which will be presented below. 
Shils sees Marxism as the only great "ideology" which has a substantial 
"scientific" content. For one indoctrinated with this school of 
thought, he or she could easily turn the logical correlates around by 
saying that this is the only great (social) "science" which exhibits a 
more than substantial "ideological" content. 
In a general sense, the question raised here concerning the Shils 
article is as follows: can college and university students, research 
scholars and laymen obtain sufficient information from the article to 
enable them to proceed with their intellectual pursuits? The answer 
must be in the negative. One may also go so far as to contend that 
despite good if not incomplete source materials the Shils article is 
more a product of distortion than of a fair and objective assessment 
of the concept ideology. 
55 
What if an investigative reporter were writing a series of articles 
on "left wing" as compared to "right wing" social movements, and he or 
she came upon the Shils article? How much utility would there be in 
evaluating the proposition that ideological culture interferes with 
truth? Should one adapt the Shils position, it would be necessary to 
dichotomize between "real" as opposed to "nominal" truths. It would 
also be necessary to use such concepts as "norms," "sub-cultures" and 
"institutions" to present a complete evaluation. Shils is guilty of 
his own accusations. He writes about ideology as he would prefer it to 
be rather than how it is presently evaluated. 
The Curtis and Petras reader is a much more elaborate work which 
combines an old tradition as well as a new tradition with an adequate 
critique of ideology and the sociology of knowledge. Should our inves-
tigative reporter be ref erred to this work and should he or she spend 
adequate time with its contents, the resulting product--a series of 
articles dealing with an ideological theme--could be much more 
substantial. 
At the outset one notes authors and articles which may be more 
identified with social-psychology, sociological theory and industrial 
sociology. A secondary observation may be that several authors are 
included (Parsons, for example) who have little identification with 
this area. Much of this, however, is explained by the editors who 
collaborate on a substantial introduction to the book, running some 
eighty-five pages of text and notes. 
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They see some common identities between the concepts "attitude" 
and "ideology" in that both suffer imprecise definition. One may 
comment here that an attempt has been made for the former by W. I. 
Thomas and for the latter by Mannheim. This, of course, is not all to 
the negative. What may actually be at work here is that both attitude 
and ideology lie atop a sea of many unknowns if not unknowables within 
the realm of society and culture. It may also indicate that one 
requires a greater knowledge of biology to understand emotional and 
cognitive states of man just as one needs knowledge of social history 
and folklore to adequately understand ideology. The fact, however, 
that both terms generate speculation and controversy could indicate a 
healthy sign for the social sciences in general. What is equally 
important, as noted by Curtis and Petras, is the popularity of the 
terms "attitude" and "ideology." Such popularity may well be based on 
the need to know more about the relationship between the individual and 
society. 
The point of departure for Curtis and Petras is the statement 
made by John Dewey in 1915 that "pure ideas" and "pure reason" are 
nonexistent. One wonders why Dewey is cited rather than William James 
who is the recognized pioneer of both pragmatism as a philosophy and 
symbolic interaction as a school of social science. 
In a more general sense they note a blending of three "traditions" 
which at present constitute the field of the sociology of knowledge: 
(1) the German philosophical-sociological tradition (folk 
psychology) 
(2) the French sociological and social-psychological tradition 
(Durkheim) 
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(3) the American social behaviorists (Chicago School). 
Should one claim that the sociology of knowledge is an untenable point 
of departure for the investigatioP of socio-cultural phenomenon, it 
can be established as noted above that the three derivatives as indi-
cated above are incompatible with each other. In a general sense if 
there is any agreement, it would be with the notion as formulated first 
by the German scholars that material conditions are relative to cultural 
conditions. 
Another approach indicated by Curtis and Petras but in no way 
developed or expanded by them is that the general area of the sociology 
of knowledge represents, in an historical sense, a "graveyard" of 
aborted theoretical ideas and fragments which could not make it solo 
{on their own) but which are now assembled in close proximity to one 
another under the broad umbrella of the "sociology of knowledge" as a 
category if not a sub-discipline. When a writer speaks of a "problem" 
within the broad spectrum of the sociology of knowledge, it is usually 
one of the elements which become conspicuous by their incompatability 
with other elements which he or she refers to. By the same token, when 
a new "branch of knowledge" or a "specialization" becomes a "spin-off" 
(to use a modern, American corporation term) from the "sociology of 
knowledge" such as recent developments in phenomenology, it is indica-
tive of the same process operating in a different direction. It is not 
unlikely that there will be more of this in the future. One should not 
forget for a single moment the number of disciplines that have an 
interest in this area. The list includes sociology, psychology, social-
psychology, philosophy, economics, political science and history. Each 
of these disciplines with their numerous specializations is engaged in 
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research, methodology and theoretical formulations. Each discipline, 
then, is in a good position to rediscover the "sociology of knowledge" 
from time to time and to extract out certain fragments for cross-
fertilization and for future elaboration. One may surmise from this 
that old ideas in the social and cultural sciences (the so-called 
"soft sciences") never die, they just accumulate as part of the 
sociology of knowledge until they are regrouped and become discovered 
by some research team badly in need of a concept or explanation. 
In further developing the theme for their edition Curtis and 
Petras state: 
The frames of reference utilized by the three branches 
can be characterized briefly as follows. The German 
branch tended to combine a philosophical spiritualism 
with Verstehende Soziologie and a concern for the 
"universal processes of history." The French branch, 
epitomized in the works of Durkheim and the crowd 
psychologists, emphasized the relationship between 
individual minds and society, as well as the structuring 
influence of the particular sociocultural environment. 
Historical processes were de-emphasized in favor of the 
connection between the mind of the individual and a 
particular society at a particular time. The most 
prominent feature of the American tradition has been its 
emphasis on interdependence as the essential variable 
in understanding the relationship between the individual 
and the sociocultural group.4 
Although the above themes are given a full treatment throughout 
the text, it is apparent early in the volume that many writers add 
little to the preconceived idea of "ideology" and the "sociology of 
knowledge." One may spend many pages in comparing the young Marx 
with the old Marx or with splitting hairs between Mannheim's concepts 
of "relationism" as opposed to "relativism" or the rediscovery of 
Pareto during the 1960's; the important consideration is what is 
accepted and what has durability. Thus, "ideology" and the "sociology 
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of knowledge" approximate other ideas and concepts which includes the 
following: "deception," "power," "strategy," "consciousness," "social 
class" (including "bourgeoise" and "proletariat"). Stated in other 
terms, ideology is analogous with political and economic rnachinat±.ons. 
At best, ideology (and its rationale, the sociology of knowledge) is 
a rationale for not only doing something or anticipating doing something, 
it is a rationale for having done something; thus, it is and may be 
utilized as a rationale for supporting the status quo. When this posi-
tion is recognized, one is able to see how such factors as "patriotism," 
"religious principles" and "civic responsibility" need not be imple-
mented separately since they are supporting propositions and clauses of 
mainstream ideologies. 
Another manifestation which may be dwelt upon within the Curtis 
and Petras text is the drawing within the mainstream of both classi-
cal and contemporary authors who have made some contribution to the 
subject of "ideology" and the "sociology of knowledge." Such a list 
would include Bacon, Comte, Scheler, Grunwald and Weber. In some cases 
it is a matter of language barrier. In other cases it is more an 
"expansion" or "linkage" with another discipline where there has been 
some preliminary development. 
An example of the above may be as follows. The cultural anthro-
pologists since 1948 have used a concept which is called "enculturation" 
which indicates the degree of success one achieves within his culture. 
One may surmise, as Melville Herskovits did not, that this concept has 
"ideological" properties and characteristics. Should this happen, then, 
another concept becomes "ideological" despite the fact that nothing is 
really settled as to the meaning of ideology as a concept. 5 
Curtis and Petras cite an actual as opposed to an imagined case 
of the above: 
Scheler uses the term "codetermination" in explaining the 
relationship between the mind and social factors, in 
order to differentiate himself from Durkheim and Marx. 
Unlike Durkheim, Scheler separates the "object of selec·-
tion" from the content and validity of ideas.6 
When pressed to its ultimate conclusions the "sociology of 
knowledge" with its concomitant concept, "ideologyf" not only serves 
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as a critique of the political, economic and social order, but it also 
serves as a critique of science and, ultimately, the social sciences. 
Thus, the mere existence of science can be traced to ideological pro-
perties if not motivations. Finally, the purposes that social science, 
in particular sociology, serves have clear-cut linkages to ideology. 
The fact that science is usually thought of as secular is indicative 
of a long standing "tug-of-war" between the secular as opposed to the 
sacred forces, resulting in the capitulation of the latter. The ques-
tion, also, of the function and purpose of sociology has been raised 
too many times in recent decades not to be aware of the rationalizing 
tendencies of this social science in making its peaceful coexistence 
possible within the social order. 
What has happened in the case of sociology is somewhat analogous 
to what has happened in our society with respect to the labor movement. 
Ronald Segal in an introspective work originally published in 1971 has 
stated: "The trade unions provide their members with a sense of pro-
tection against outrage by capital, while having themselves been assimi-
lated into the system's efficient functioning. 117 Thus, both the 
profession and the labor movement work in behalf of the system. Should 
one seek to find a plausible explanation, it might be indicated that 
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both are (ideologically) locked into the system. Secondly, the system 
does not expect nor does it receive full cooperation from all of its 
parts and elements. Third, as Georg Simmel theoretically demonstrated 
many years ago in his essays on the "sociology of conflict," many 
individuals as well as institutions maintain a semblance of cohesion 
because of conflict. 8 
With this constant stream of "in-puts" and "out-·puts" regarding 
the "sociology of knowledge," one may suggest that a final theoretical 
formulization will never take place. Judging from this state of flux 
as indicated by Curtis and Petras, this is indicative of the vast pro-
pensities of this area. No one can argue with this position as long 
as a state of complete and total theoretical anarchy can be prevented. 
One may be cautious, however, of the label of ideology and the mystique 
of the "sociology of knowledge." This noted caution is what leads 
Curtis and Petras to an important policy statement early in their text 
that a definition of the "sociology of knowledge" is, at present, 
impossible. 
Some insight is afforded by these writers in their assessment of 
Dewey and Mead: 
... the works of Mead come to grips with the most 
critical question confronting the sociology of knowledge: 
Is such an approach epistemologically possible? At the 
same time, Mead's works, like Dewey's, are linked to the 
French branch of the sociology of knowledge perspective 
through their concern with minds arising out of the social 
process. Although the emphases are decidedly different, 
the underlying principles are similar. 9 
The Curtis and Petras text is one which should advance our 
understanding of ideology and the sociology of knowledge. This state-
ment can be made with few if any reservations at this time. Yet, it 
62 
is interesting to note that contributors to the volume, particularly 
those of contemporary vintage (Merton, Parsons, Wolff and Znaniecki to 
name but only a few) see this issue largely from their own theoretical 
heritage and position. Thus, they add to the body of knowledge by the 
weight and thrust of their interest and contribution. Concomitantly, 
they take away from the general knowledge by their lack of homogeneity, 
their lack of consensus, their motivation and greed in attempting to 
establish a "beach-head" for their orientation and point of view and, 
finally, their inability to understand diverse positions based largely 
on theory and hypotheses without substantial data for proper tabulation 
and testability. It is almost as though sociologists have assumed 
the role of philosophers and the latter have assumed the role of the 
former with the end result being an acute form of anomie. One must 
account for various dimensions to do with time, language and levels of 
understanding. But one must also anticipate a higher degree of syn-
thesis in the future in regards to a school of the sociology of 
knowledge. 
What is actually needed are two entities: 
(1) whole man 
(2) whole knowledge. 
There must be some admission on the part of scholars that these 
entities have not materialized in the past. What exists at the present 
time amounts to fragmentation both of concepts of man as well as con-
cepts of knowledge. A "conspiracy theory of knowledge" and a bureau-
cratic blueprint for man and his actions will not suffice even if 
subsumed under the double-barrelled headings of "social action" and 
"social system." Hence, if there is an underlying theme which pervades 
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the Curtis and Petras text it is that such potential and possibilities 
exist for a future "sociology of knowledge." 
Delving deeply into the various approaches to the sociology of 
knowledge, Curtis and Petras find themselves in the middle of some of 
the most critical problems of sociology, that concerning values and 
the role of the sociologist. Here, in addition to presenting what may 
be termed "standard materials"--the writings of Weber, Mills, Lynd and 
Gouldner--reference is also made to the "sociology of sociology" from 
which little substantial data have been accumulated. In getting 
involved with the critical issues the authors imply that the sociology 
of knowledge should be used as an "antecedent" variable in that if 
greater care is given to understanding the sociology of knowledge, much 
confusion which presently exists in contemporary sociology can be 
rectified. 
In advancing their position on the "sociology of sociology" the 
authors summarize what has been done thus far: 
There have been at least four lines of inquiry. First, 
through the years, scholars have utilized an implicit 
sociology of knowledge in several fine studies of trends 
and movements in the history of social thought. This 
type of research has been greatly extended in the past 
few years. Second, and more recently, there have been 
indications that comparative studies of sociology in 
various countries are beginning to receive more atten-
tion. Third, limited research has developed on certain 
values and interests of sociologists--e.g., studies of 
their voting behavior, styles of work, and publication 
productivity. Finally, there has been continued interest 
in the implicit ideologies and value premises in certain 
areas of contemporary American theory and research. 10 
In brief, the Curtis and Petras book is one which is designed 
not only for starting the student in the path of learning about the 
sociology of knowledge but for also introducing the student to the 
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many problems and controversies inherent in this field of study. One 
learns that there is a linguistic or communication problem as well as 
a historical and cultural problem. There is a problem of conceptuali-
zation as well as a problem of reductionism. There is a problem. of 
stereotype as well as a problem of values. Despite all of this the 
sociology of knowledge looms large on the horizon as an area of sociol-
ogy which holds the promise for an amalgamation of theory and practice. 
Through this vast maze of confusion the sociology of knowledge appears 
as the proper formula for understanding man and society. 
One might say as Max Scheler has done that this field is yet in 
its incipient stages. He points out that: 
The problems of a sociology of knowledge and cognition, in 
their variety, scope, articulation, and intrinsic inter-
relatedness, have hitherto hardly been perceived or cor-
rectly posed, to say nothing of being solved.11 
The Curtis and Petras text goes a long way in its indoctrination 
of the reader into the field of the sociology of knowledge. There are, 
however, noticeable omissions and deletions such as the works of Bell, 
Veblen and Sorokin. Some discussion is projected for the above, but 
there is no excerpt by which the reader can make valid and meaningful 
comparisons. Some of the articles which are included are those which 
are at the fringe of this sub-discipline. Such an article would be that 
contribution by Karl Popper. In a rather negative note he says: 
The sociology of knowledge is not only self-destructive, 
not only a rather gratifying object of socioanalysis, it 
also shows an astonishing failure to understand precisely 
its main subject, the social aspects of knowledge, or 
rather, of scientific methoa.12 
In this connection one sees Popper as one bent on destruction of 
the incipient technology associated with the sociology of knowledge. 
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Such is not the case. All that he is doing is reminding the reader 
that prior to Marx and his present generation of supporters both Hegel 
and Kant established procedures for evaluating knowledge which have 
been badly neglected if not distorted. Thus., Popper sees himself as 
a critique of the strict philosophical constructs associated with the 
sociology of knowledge. His mention of the concept "socio-analysis" 
is designed to counter the popular concept "psycho-analysis." Much of 
this comparison is left to the reader's imagination. One should, of 
course, take into consideration the humorous intent of this writer, 
well-known for brilliance and wit. 
Any summary of the Curtis and Petras reader should take into 
consideration the fact that it does present a fair rendition of the 
field. All of the articles have some interest to the developmental 
stages of our understanding of ideology and the sociology of knowledge. 
In some ways this collection of essays reminds one of the famous 
sociology text edited by Robert Ezra Park and Ernest W. Burgess, An 
Introduction to the Science of Sociology, because the Park and Burgess 
text also contained what they considered to be the best representative 
essays on sociology up to that time. One should spend considerable 
time in an analysis and comparison of both texts. 
On the whole, techniques of analysis and formulation in the sociol-
ogy of knowledge strike one as looking for something which does not 
exist or, should it exist, there is no present mode of understanding 
requisite with its complete evaluation. Indecision begets further 
indecision. Futility leads to further futility. Playing the game of 
variables, typologies, hypotheses and temporal priority leads one 
absolutely nowhere. The crisis leads to panic. The panic leads to 
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prolonged ignorance. The problem calls for cool, dispassionate famil-
iarity with social and cultural history. The situation requires a type 
of objectivity which allows for a fair elaboration of bias and sub-
jectivity. In some remote, implicit manner the Curtis and Petras reader 
provides for a significant amount of objectivity in this area. It may 
be replete with shortcomings, but it displays enough of both classical 
and contemporary materials to be worthy of a place in the mainstream of 
sociology of knowledge developments. 
13 
A third volume of some merit is that by Maquet. What is impor-
tant here is: (1) a multilingual bibliography of leading works up to 
1950 and (2) a full treatment of Sorokin as a contributor to the 
general area of the sociology of knowledge. It is the opinion of 
F.S.C. Northrop in his preface to this work that the choice of Sorokin 
for inclusion alongside Mannheim is a good one. 
Maquet sees the broad guidelines of the sociology of knowledge as 
encompassing three main factors: 
(1) the conditioning social facts; 
(2) the ideas making up human knowledge which are 
conditioned; and 
(3) the relation joining the former factor to the 
latter. 14 
The treatment afforded Mannheim may be judged as fair and adequate. 
One should keep in mind the date of publication of thi3 volume which 
was not too distant from those of Mannheim, both German and English 
editions. Mannheim is seen as exploring meanings and connections 
between a social group and an intellectual perspective. This same 
theme is projected for the whole field of the sociology of knowledge: 
The sociology of knowledge, a positive science, has as 
its ambition a precise description of the way in which 
certain social factors influence certain mental 
productions, and to do so follows a strict method 
of observation.15 
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Perfection is not a primary characteristic of the above method wi\.ich 
is assumed to lead to "generalizations" and, finally, to "theories." 
All of this takes place in the shadow of philosophy. 
It is with the evaluation of Sorokin's works that this volume 
establishes a claim to classical status. For Sorokin there are three 
manners of indicating truth: (1) ideational, (2) idealistic, and (3) 
sensate. The "ideational" is one in which there is a denial of the 
senses. The "sensate" depends on the senses for its particular brand 
of knowledge. The "idealistic" represents elements of both of the 
above. An interesting comment by Maquet is as follows: 
The only difference between Sorokin's method and that of 
the historians of ideas is that he has endeavored to 
base his evaluations of the influence of trends of 
thought upon the examination of all the thinkers of a 
period and upon a more precise determination of their 
recognized value.16 
What is of extreme importance to Sorokin is what he classifies as 
six main trends within the three systems as described above. These 
are as follows: 
(1) empiricism: sensory perception as the source of knowledge 
(2) rationalism: two forms--religious or ideational and 
idealistic 
(3) mysticism: geared to a recognition of truth founded on 
faith 
(4) skepticism: a doubt as to the possibility of valid knowledge 
(5) fideism: truth may be achieved only by an act of the will 
(6) criticism: a form of agnosticism which implies that ultimate 
reality can never be known. 
The system proposed by Sorokin establishes that social and cul-
tural change are constant variables involved in broad transitions of 
ideologies or beliefs and attitudes corresponding to the social and 
cultural values. This explanation is somewhat clarified by the 
author: 
Sorokin utilizes the analogy of the living organism to 
make his principle understood. Even if the exterior 
conditions were such as to remain always constant, one 
could not prevent a man from changing as the years go 
by. This naturally does not prevent the acknowledgment 
of the role of exterior forces in the changes in the 
sociocultural systems. Their interaction with the 
immanent principle accentuates the tendency toward 
change. 17 
Twenty-five years ago it appeared that Sorokin and his complex 
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sociocultural postulates and theories would blend into those of Darwin 
and Einstein. Such has not been the case. The approach by Sorokin is 
a complex one. History for Sorokin is not a simple rendition of the 
past; it represents a force. People are not just warm bodies. They 
are amalgams of organic wholes who breathe meaningfully because of 
their concise value systems. Society is ever and always a potential 
entity awaiting new forms of stimulation and conditioning. Perhaps 
some of this represents Sorokin's own experiences working both under 
Pavlov in applied psychology and Kerensky in political manipulation. 
Some insight is gained in the following statement: "Sorokin defines 
influence by the procedure by which he attributes values to each 
thinker."18 
The rise and fall of Sorokin's productivity and influence is not 
the subject of this dissertation. But, it is reasonable to assume 
that scholars of the future will rediscover these scholarly contribu-
tions to the sociology of knowledge. This, unfortunately, was not the 
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case with the Curtis and Petras volume. Perhaps the problem with 
Sorokin is that his sociology of knowledge is lacking in ideology. 
The last study to be considered within the category of "mainline 
19 
materials" is the recent work by Nettler. This author devotes a 
whole chapter of the book to what she calls "ideological explanations." 
Here one finds some of the clearest statements about ideology that are 
available in the present literature. One of the interesting points 
explained is that in the 18th Century ideology meant "social science." 
By the 19th Century it had become "false consciousness." More recently 
it is explained as follows: "The hallmark of the ideological explainway 
is that it rests on statements false, unproved, or unprovable through 
reference to empirical rules. 1120 
A more detailed accounting of contemporary use is as follows: 
The theme of ideology is doctrine •••. [rt] includes 
the interwoven explainways called "magical," "mythical," 
and "religious." It prevails in the moral beliefs we 
need and in the political and juridical perspectives 
invoked in their name. Ideology resides in the explana-
tory principles of "luck," "fate," and "God's will." 
It is the prevailing way of explaining collective 
behavior and it combines with empathy to clarify 
individual action.21 
But ideology is more than luck or fate: 
[rt] is action-oriented. The sterile descriptions read 
from the actuary's tables do not tell "what is to be 
done." Ideologies do. The urge to act with one's 
explanations is energized by the tendency to evaluate 
what one describes. It may be partly measured in 
explanations by the ideology sentence-ratio.22 
Thus, what may be lacking in the Sorokin model is available in the 
Nettler model. The former builds a "sociology of knowledge" without 
ideology. The latter "explains" ideology without a "sociology of 
knowledge." Who is right? 
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CHAPTER V 
THE END OF IDEOLOGY DEBATE 
Daniel Bell did more than initiate a controversy when he compiled 
his now famous text, The End of Ideology. Although this material was 
originally designed as a critique of political and economic values of 
the 1950's, by the 1970's many intellectuals and serious scholars use 
Bell as a point of reference for the total concept of ideology. Two 
statements by Bell are important for this analysis: 
(1) Ideology is' the conversion of ideas into social 
levers • • • • For the ideologue, truth arises in 
action, and meaning is given to experience by 
the "transforming moment. 111 
(2) In our time, the conspiracy theory of events has 
gained ground. Along with those suspicions, 
there is an accompanying decline of moral 
temper.2 
The implications of these statements as far as political and 
economic matters are concerned are far reaching. What it amounts to 
is a type of situational formula for ideology. Robert E. Lane, writing 
in the 1960's, makes an interesting comparison between Bell's thesis 
and a similar thesis developed by Henry Aiken. 3 Lane's initial comments 
are as follows: 
What is implied in this contrast is, first, that analysis 
is taking the place of ideology; second, that at mid-
century there is a kind of exhaustion of political ideas 
in the West, and hence, third, that the transformation 
of broadly conceived political ideas into social action 
is no longer the center of an exciting struggle.4 
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In his study Lane makes a dichotomous distinction within ideo-
logies. For him there are the "forensic" ideologies of a conscious 
ideologist and there are the "latent" ideologies characteristic of a 




Edward Shils takes a strong position in this ongoing controversy. 
For him, similar to the well-worn imperialist slogan, "there will 
always be ideology" since it is part of what he calls the "human 
condition." Shils projects his argument as follows: 
As long as human societies are afflicted by crises and 
as long as man has a need to be in direct contact with 
the sacred, ideologies will recur. As long as there is 
a discrepancy between the ideal and the actual, a strong 
impetus for ideologies will exist. 6 
As an indication that there was never full consensus in the 
Daniel Bell position on ideology, the following declaration is inserted 
for purposes of comparison: 
It is a shame that the West has been on the defensive 
all these years. The time has come to pass to the 
offensive on every front. The initiative should be 
seized in a dozen fields, especially the political, 
moral, personal, intellectual, and spiritual. To think 
of vigorously and relentlessly challenging the Communists 
on their theory of man, government, and history, on whether 
the mind is really free in their realm, on why they broke 
away from the wonderful spiritual heritage of their peoples, 
and on why they persecute those who believe in God and 
Christ is quite revolutionary these days when the utmost 
that people seem to be capable of thinking of is "systems," 
"societies," "gross national products," and who is going 
to reach the moon first. 7 
What Malik does not take into consideration is that there has been 
a shift in ideologies in the West in that "systems," "societies," "gross 
national product" and "flying to the moon" are more important than 
wi11ni_nq "wars <lqainst poverty" and in guarantees of "civil rights" for 
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depressed classes. Nevertheless, displacement of values does not and 
should not imply termination of such values via their ideological 
symbols. There is still a great deal of latitude in the American 
society fo r adventures and persistence regarding "democracy," "freedom," 
and "open-class folklore." The more dominant ideologies, however, have 
a tendency to take such values for granted as if they have alr eady been 
achieved and now it is our duty to be loyal to national values within a 
sea of international relations and competition, hence , our preoccupation 
with the "race to the moon" and the "gross national product." In 
essence it is as if we have experienced our second political and eco-
nomic revolution without firing a single shot. We have achieved our 
ends, ambiguous as they may be, without the tragedy of bloodletting and 
internal strife. It is almost as humorous as John Kenneth Galbraith 
telling his "mom and pop" business participants in the American economy 
h h . . 8 t at t ey are as important and powerful as the top 500 corporations. 
Another ideological theme which has never expired completely is the 
super-patriotism of "anti-communism." Whereas Malik argues for the need 
of a "western revolution," Gonzalez argues to the contrary because of 
the preoccupation with anti-communism. His remarks are as follows: 
No Western capitalist nation is so brainwashed 'today as 
America. The anti-Communist propaganda whi ch has been 
turned out in the last fifteen years has permeated and 
impregnated everything--the press, literature, TV, films, 
radio, the university, the pulpit, the school, and the 
home. In this propaganda, Communism is more than a 
theory or an economic, political, and social system 
which now governs nearly half the human race . It is 
something monstrous, diabolical, evil, atheistic, and 
noxious that must be destroyed as a dangerous plague 
at whatever price and by whatever means.9 
The above description of keeping ideology alive in America may 
indicate that there has been a tendency to overdo the conspiracy 
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theory of ideology. What with both "cold" and "hot" war experiences 
in recent decades, there is now more a movement under way of detente 
or "strained relations" with societies dominated by socialistic socio-
economic systems. But, in essence, whether the above is right or 
wrong, it takes away considerably from the "end of ideology debate" as 
proposed by Daniel Bell and his associates. Yet another example of 
substantial reasoning against the so-called controversy is that suggested 
by Feliks Gross. His appraisal of ideology is as follows: 
Ideology rationalizes or states explicitly the socioeconomic 
interest of a social group or class; it contains value 
structures and goals and supplies a sense of direction 
for political action; it supplies rationalization of the 
quest for power; it is a powerful integrating force and 
appeal to identity; in appealing to economic and polit-
ical interests and to noneconomic motivation such as 
psychological and moral needs, it harbors pragmatic, 
rational, and emotional appeals of the movements and, 
last but not least, ethical appeal. Generally, it is 
the ideology, the goi0s, that move the followers of a 
movement to action.· 
An appraisal of the above appears to slant the argument in the 
direction of ideology. Thus, it is not too important what type of 
ideology one adheres to since the important consideration is that some 
particular ideology will act as catalyst in a particular social situa-
tion or will serve as the mortar to bind the bricks of political life 
together. One sees the individual as a kind of robot in such explana-
tion. It appears as though the individual is programmed in accordance 
with a particular type of ideology. Some insight into the role of the 
individual is explained by Maurice Friedman who states: 
We become ourselves through each particular action; we 
choose ourselves in each act of becoming. Actually, we 
cannot know our real potentialities in the abstract at 
all. All we can know are generalizations about ourselves 
from past situations in which we have had other and 
different resources. our actual resources are inseparably 
bound up with what we are as persons, with our 
direction as persons, and with what calls us out 
in the concrete situation. We cannot foresee these. 
Potentiality is not in us as an already existing 
objective reality. We know it only as it becomes 
actuality in our response to each new situation.11 
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To properly understand Bell's position on ideology it is necessary 
to refer to one of his earlier works. 12 In a text published originally 
in 1952 his comments point towards the general direction of not only 
unmasking ideology but also commenting on its decllne. The point of 
departure for this discourse centers around the failure of socialism in 
America. As Bell stated in this study, " •• the failure of the 
socialist movement in the United States is rooted in its inability to 
resolve a basic dilemma of ethics and politi~s. 1113 In a more detailed 
description Bell states: 
Neither nineteenth-century American radicals nor the 
American socialists faced up to this problem of social 
compromise. The utopias that were spun so profusely 
in the nineteenth century assumed that in the course of 
evolution "reason" would find its way and the perfect 
society would emerge.14 
One of the major handicaps for the movement as seen by Bell is 
that, "Socialism is an eschatological movement, it is sure of its 
15 
destiny because 'history' leads it to its goal." 
Drawing from the literature of Marxism, Bell demonstrates that 
all claims made for the proletariat in America were refuted by advanced 
technology and a welfare oriented labor movement. Stated in Bell's own 
words: "In the America of the nineteenth century, almost every social 
movement had involved an effort by the worker to escape his lot as a 
16 
worker." 
With conditions and events working them as a political party and 
as a social movement, Bell demonstrates that radicalism as such has 
77 
never been a part of the mainstream of American politics. Using the 
American Federation of Labor as his point of leverage, the formula as 
proposed was that the laboring man was as good as the business man. 
This was a more dazzling attraction than that of socialism which was 
waiting for the inevitable decline of capitalism with all of its greed 
and inequities. 
In explaining the decline and fall of American socialism Bell 
explains: 
The subsequent history of American socialism is the 
story of breakup and decline. Although 1912 was the 
high-water mark of the socialist vote, it also brought 
an uneasy awareness that the party would never be a 
major force in American politics.17 
Anticipating his later "end of ideology" position in this text, 
Bell contends: 
American society at the middle of the twentieth century 
was evolving in a far different direction from that pre-
dicted by Marxist sociology . . . . The old simplistic 
theories no longer hold. We seem to be evolving toward 
some form of technical-military-administrative state, 
especially as the pressures of a permanent war economy 
bring into focus a priority of needs which are national 
in character and override the demands of any particular 
interest group.18 
It should be noted at this juncture that Bell was not alone in 
taking his "end of ideology" position. Among writers who were writing 
in this same tradition was Harold Lasswell. 19 With his now famous 
concept of the "garrison state," Lasswell, in a general sense, per-
ceived a movement away from democrary towards fascism. 20 In yet 
another study a detailed explanation is offered: 21 
The study involved the content analysis of editorials 
in the prestige newspapers in five industrial nations: 
the U. S., Britain, France, Germany, and the u. S. S. R. 
It was assumed that in every country, the ideology of 
the ruling elite is reflected in the editorial content 
of the prestige newspapers. The analysis revealed that 
in the years 1890 to 1950 a change had indeed t~ken 
place, and that the values of democracy and int<erna-
tionalism were losing ground while those of totaii tarian-
ism, militarism, conflict, and aggression were gaining. 22 
Prior to Bell's statement of policy on ideology, he attended a 
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"Future of Freedom" meeting held at Milan, Italy, in 1955. Accompanying 
him on this journey were Seymour Martin Lipset and Edward Shils who are 
also involved in the debate but not to the extent that Bell is involved. 
However, with these scholars in some degree of consensus and others 
such as Raymond Aron and Gunnar Myrdal taking similar positions the 
criticism of established ideologies becomes more than an incidental 
issue. David R. Segal has written of this situation in the following 
manner: 
Their argument was that, largely because of increasing 
economic affluence in the Western industrial nations, 
extremist ideologies appeared to be declining. This 
decline was reflected in the observation that the 
extremes of political right and left had been shown to 
have similarities that were more impressive than their 
differences.23 
More specifically, Bell's position is as follows: " ..• the 
ideologies that had emerged from the politics of nineteenth-century 
?4 
Europe were by the 1950's exhausted."-
Expanding on the above premise, Bell argues that radical ideologies 
had not "delivered" the good life. In other words, they had not lived 
up to their expectations. The horrors of both Nazi and Soviet forced-
labor (death) camps could not be denied. Also of some major signifi-
cance for Bell is the liberalization of the capitalist system and what 
has come to be called the rise of the "welfare" state. In brief, 
American citizens enjoyed the best of two worlds without participating 
in the 19th Century, classical "struggle." 
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Thus, one gathers from reading Bell along with Lipset and Myrdal 
that the fundamental problems of our western society have been solved. 
Lipset's views are most concise. He states that: 
Greater economic productivity is associated with a more 
equitable distribution of consumption goods and educa-
tion--factors contributing to a reduction of intra-
societal tension . • • . And increased education enhances 
the propensity of different groups to "tolerate" each 
other, to accept the complex idea that truth and error 
are not necessarily on one side.25 
Speaking out on this issue at an earlier date, Lipset follows a 
similar line of reasoning. He exclaims: 
The characteristic pattern of stable Western democ-
racies in the mid-twentieth century is that they are 
in a "post-politics" phase--that is, there is rela-
tively little difference between the democratic left 
and right, the socialists are moderates, and the con-
servatives accept the welfare state. In a large 
measure this situation reflects the fact that in 
these countries the workers have won their fight for 
full citizenship.26 
Both Lipset and Bell have strong congruence with respect to their 
positions on the end of ideology debate. This can have important 
implications for the future of such fields as "political sociology," 
"the sociology of law," "social institutions," and "collective 
behavior" as well as "complex organizations." Gouldner is critical 
of their approach and relates it to an over emphasis if not a primary 
preoccupation with "methodology" which he interprets as conducive to 
totalitarianism, a kind of constant if not immediate check on the 
1 . 27 popu ation. 
Myrdal, another exemplar of the end of ideology school, builds 
his case on logical, historical grounds: 
Marx had little to say which directly concerns the 
present world problems. In fact, Marx and his more 
immediate followers did not envisage very clearly 
the post-colonial problems with which we are wrestling, 
and this should not surprise us, as he wrote so long 
ago and so many things have happened since. 28 
Despite the above details, it is Bell who is; most clear in his 
position on the end of ideology. It is a matter of closing the book 
80 
on the past and opening the book on the future. There are interesting 
conditions and reservations. There is to be no end of speculation 
about utopia. Utopia is still, for Bell, a driving force in civiliza-
tion. Put into Bell's own formula, he states that: II a utopia 
has to specify where one wants to go, how to get there, the costs of 
the enterprise, and some realization of, and justification for the 
29 
determination of who is to pay." 
Thus, the end of ideology calls for an end of rhetoric and those 
rhetoricians who have envisioned revolution as a means to an end if not 
an end in itself. Judged from the Mannheim perspective, Bell's fol-
lowing statement makes no sense at all: 
The problems which confront us at home and in the world 
are resistent to the old terms of ideological debate 
between "left" and "right," and if "ideology" by now, 
and with good reason, is an irretrievably fallen word, 30 
it is not necessary that "utopia" suffer the same fate. 
Searching desperately for support and justification for his 
theoretical position, all that Bell can come up with is a quotation 
from Thomas Jefferson that, "'the present belongs to the living. 11131 
This is almost as diluted as Nettler's citation of Bell, who, she says, 
"has defined an ideologist as a man running down the street shouting, 
'I've got an answer! Who's got a question? 11132 Last, it is Bottomore 
who points out that America, stripped of the input of European ideas 
and ideologies, is, indeed, a cultural and intellectual wasteland. 
lli s conception of an "ideologist" is as follows: ". . . a producer of 
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general ideas which criticize fundamental aspects of the social struc-
ture and culture [who] may still be regarded with some suspicion or 
. ,,33 
aversion. 
It is, however, with a direct answer to Bell and his associates, 
h h b . . 34 t at t e controversy ecomes interesting. This particular volume 
contains the original article published by Bell. There are, of course, 
articles contained within this volume which display various shade~ of 
opinion. 
One which is particularly potent is that by Lewis S. Feuer which 
he calls "Beyond Ideology." For him, a man without an ideology--a 
rarity--may be likened to a man without a country. For Feuer the argu-
ment is one which demonstrates the following: 
The adherent to ideology believes that the making of 
history is its handmaiden. He demands for himself and 
his followers the assurance that "history is on our 
side." Ideology makes men believe that they are acting 
with the blessing, with the sanction of the Total Uni-
verse • • • • All the modes of ideology have a common 
source of emotional satisfaction.35 
Despite pros and cons of numerous distinguished writers in 
sociology and related fields, there is a reluctance on the part of 
one author to enter into the controversy. It is William Delany's 
contention in his paper, "The Role of Ideology: A Summation," that 
we cannot discuss something that we know so little about. He reasons 
that the most plausible explanation for this dilemma is that American 
academic sociology has stressed empirical studies and has neglected 
theoretical studies. 
Delaney sees his position as one which is in opposition to the end 
of ideology school. He explains in part, as follows, with a quotation 
from Norman Birnbaum: 
"The sociological study of ideology raises, in acute 
form, some of the most pressing problems of contemporary 
sociology. It entails a confrontation of Marxism, in 
its several versions, and bourgeoise sociology .•• it 
is at the intersection of the empirical and philosophical 
components of our discipline . • . • [It raises] a number 
of questions to which no answers of a conclusive sort 
have yet been found: in particular, the question of the 
precise relationship [and interrelationship] of ideas and 
social structure, and the vexed concept of interests II 
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36 
Professor Delaney feels that, "Values are inevitable and desirable 
in social science •••• It is not that they enter, but how they 
t . 1 . . f. k h . . . 1 .. 37 en er socia sc1ent1 ic wor t at is critica • This writer resolves 
the issue by noting four hypotheses: 
(1) a lessening of support for Marxist ideologies in the West 
with an increasing support for such ideologies in the East; 
(2) a type of bell-shaped curve concerning utopia in the West; 
(3) a secularization of "ideologies" and "utopias" in the West; 
and 
(4) less influence of political utopias in the social and politi-
38 
cal movements of the West. 
Other interpretations of the controversy are equally as interesting 
as the above. Irving Kristal, one of the bright contemporary socio-
logical writers, after a thorough analysis of Bell's book, states: 
There is no question that terribly important things have 
happened to America in recent decades; but "the end of 
ideology" is not one of them, and Mr. Bell's title is in 
that respect a little misleading. The feverish urge for 
material improvement and technological innovation is as 
prevalent as it ever was; the need for easy explanations 
of the tangled, incomprehensible reality is as pressing. 
What has happened is that one particular form of ideology 
has collapsed. By the "end of ideology," Mr. Bell appears 
to mean, above all, the collapse of the socialist ideal. 
And he is quite correct in the emphasis he puts upon this 
t'Vf'nt. 39 
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Dennis Wrong's critique of the "issue" with both Bell and Lipset 
in mind is that they remain too Marxist. For Wrong, what is important 
is the vision of a new society, " ... a vision that must deeply 
penetrate human consciousness before the question of how it might be 
fulfilled is seriously considered. 1140 Michael Harrington views the 
end of ideology as a "catastrophe." Making an assumption that a new 
social order is an imperative Harrington points out that, "Businessmen 




Irving Louis Horowitz, in his attack on the end of ideology issue, 
spends more time castigating Lipset than Bell. As he reads the former 
and attempts an evaluation he says, "Right must become Left, fear must 
42 
become morality, and confusion must become democracy." In a heated 
conclusion which attempts to expose Lipset as the conservative which he 
is, Horowitz quotes Marx: "'Impotence expresses itself in a single 
43 
proposition--the maintenance of the status quo.'" In a general sense 
this writer sees the end of ideology debate as an attack on left-wing 
or radical (socialist) ideology. 
Stephen W. Rousseas and James Farganis, writing on "American 
Politics and the End of Ideology" see the problem largely as one 
replete with confusion over terms. Their key statement reaffirms the 
classical concept of Mannheim. 
When Bell and Lipset speak of the "end of ideology," 
what they mean is the "end of utopian thought," for 
they are both clearly referring to the decline of 
socialist or Marxian ideas within the context of an 
affluent Western soQiety. 4 4 
Perhaps the clearest statement on the issue is that presented by 
Robert A. Haber. After describing a brief history of the concept 
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ideology, he explains the problems as he understands them in his paper: 
"The End of Ideology as Ideology." These are as follows: 
(1) ideology has no central meaning; it is multiple in scope; 
(2) no way to test, empirically, whether or not ideology has 
ended; and 
(3) theory is untenable in that it describes a change and 
45 
implies that it is for the good. 
Professor Haber makes a distinction between "ideological" as 
opposed to "reformist" thinking. For him, "The 'end of ideology' theory 
• I 46 d' h is really an 'end of ideological politics' theory.' Accor ing to t e 
scheme as presented here the end of ideology school is more "reformist" 
than "ideological." Ideology, as such, must contain certain elements 





values, moral in tone, assumed as absolute: 
a projected model of the "good society;" 
an on-going criticism of the present system; 
47 
a plan to spring the present to the future. 
Daniel Bell and Henry David Aiken defend themselves and their 
colleagues by referring to a maze of historical events and interpreta-
tions. Thus, ideology was born within a framework of alienation, but 
Marxism later became an ideology in its own right. Hence, what they 
object to is ideology as a secular religion. Aiken labels current 
"political ideology as nothing but political discourse •.. on its most 
general formative level. 1148 
Again, one notes the dance of semantics and the reaffirmation of 
intellectual honesty on the part of Bell and his associate (Aiken). 
The central problem lingers on political and economic matters as will 
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be discussed below. The important thing to emphasize at this point is 
the adherents to the Mannheim position and those with other views; it 
is similar to accepting or rejecting Malthus. 
Although it may sound muted and somewhat dated, the "end of ideo-
logy" debate ranks in the forefront of sociological developments during 
the past two or three decades. In one sense it is reminiscent of 
Floyd Allport's contention that there is no such thing as the "group" 
but only the "individual" and his or her immediate milieu. In another 
sense it reminds one of Herbert Blumer representing sociological theory 
in his challenge to the operationalism proposed by G. A. Lundberg. One 
might also compare the "ideology confrontation," to some extent, to the 
sociological tradition of the Ward-Ross controversy. Perhaps this is 
what keeps modern sociology a viable social science. However, despite 
this tradition and freedom of insight, there are some consequences of 
this movement which may be listed as follows: 
(1) this has created a greater degree of confusion in regards 
to the concept ideology; 
(2) some would contend that the end of ideology represents a 
position of consensus and support for the status quo; 
(3) the question of whether or not the old ideologies are still 
with us; 
(4) the arguments proposed by Bell, Lipset, Aiken and others 
hardly seem to hold true for the ranks of the laboring 
classes and the unemployed in America today; 
(5) welfare state measures may compromise capitalism but 
capitalism is still the essential economic system; 
(6) judging from voter participation, industrial strikes, and 
civil rights demonstrations, the end of ideology is not yet 
in sight even though we may be experiencing changing 
ideologies. 
In addition to the above, one may compare this debate to that 
more recently instituted by Gouldner even though his ideas concerning 
value judgments of sociologists are derivative of the works of Max 
49 
Weber. The contention by Gouldner that there are two branches of 
sociology: (1) American Academic and (2) European Marxian, is cer-
tainly based in ideological postulates and constructs. More specifi-
cally, Gouldner's stress on what he conceptualizes as "domain 
assumptions" definitely has strong ideological linkage. 
It could be projected that to settle the ideology debate would, 
in turn, resolve many other problems inherent in sociology. One 
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approach to this problem would be for sociologists to be grounded more 
in relative than absolute perceptions. How could this be done, one may 
ask. Perhaps a balance of training in philosophy and history to temper 
the rigidity of methods and statistics could serve as a beginning. 
But, it may be argued, was not Daniel Bell trained in such a manner? 
The same could be said for Seymour Martin Lipset, Gunnar Myrdal and 
others of the end of ideology persuasion. 
Why, then, are such writers willing to acquiesce insofar as 
traditional ideologies are concerned? Is it that they invite a more 
favorable corporate public to support their ideas? This seems to be 
more than an incidental explanation for their type of orientation. 
How many sociologists are regular contributors to Fortune magazine? 
Daniel Bell is well known to Fortune readers. How many social 
scientists have been given blank checks for research? Gunnar Myrdal 
has been sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation in his now classic 
rendition of race relations in America--An American Dilemma. 
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Thus, the question may be raised, is the end of ideology a sign 
for the end of free inquiry in the social sciences and in the humani-
ties? Are we to assum~ that progress is measured in motor car produc-
tion and executive salaries? Such rationalization may not be too far 
removed from social reality. And what are the alternatives? Is 
Fascism or Communism inevitable once we decline to support the present 
social order? Why is Daniel Bell so concerned and so preoccupied with 
explaining "post-industrial society"? Is this merely a subterfuge 
brought on by his position in the "end of ideology" debate? 
Professor Bell continues with his thesis in a new work. 50 This 
new text has been praised and criticized by many scholars in leading 
sociological journals. The essence for purposes of this dissertation 
is that it is an expanded continuation of the end of ideology debate 
which has been labeled an end of utopia treatise by Reinhard Bendix. 
Since it is a continuation of this controversy, it is a further attempt 
to create for present day sociology a conservative image. Thus, what 
Parsons has accomplished for ideology by ignoring international issues 
and affairs, Bell has done by masking himself as a liberal or radical 
while projecting conservatism by mutilating ideology. Ideology, the 
opposite of science, is a symbol of hope for man caught up in what Max 
Weber called the "iron cage" or what is representative of bureaucratic 
life in the post capitalist West. 
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CHAPTER VI 
RADICAL SCX:::IOLOGY AS IDEOLOGY 
In contemplating what, specifically, is involved in the category 
"radical sociology," one is confronted with similar issues such as 
those which have been noted for "ideology" and the "sociology of know-
ledge." It appears that one may note some similar characteristics in 
that "ideology" is to "New Left" as "radical sociology" is to the 
"sociology of knowledge." It may be mentioned here that the New Left 
Movement, such as it is and continues to exist, has been supported by a 
minority of sociologists both as writers or ideologists as well as 
activists or participants. 
What this represents is, in effect, a conscious rejection of the 
ideology of academic sociology which, calling itself "value-free," is, 
concomitantly, non-political. Thus, as Jerry Rose has recently stated 
in an elaboration of Mannheim's position: 
• • • people do not choose their basic ways of thinking 
about and evaluating the world. The basic values and 
structural arrangements of a society are incorporated 
in the behavior of every person with whom the person 
associates, and he breathes Puritan or democratic or 
authoritarian ways of life as he would breathe the air 
itself .1 
The above is helpful in explaining the relationship between radical 
sociology and the New Left for the former is considerably smaller in 
size than the latter. Sociologists, however, do have a role to play in 
the "movement," which identifies itself with all of the civil rights 
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issues extant in America since 1954, the year of the famous bus strike 
in Montgomery, Alabama. 
Radical sociologists, on the other hand, are those who, being fed 
up with the erudite sterility of Parsonian theory and its action to end 
all action, joined the movement to make a genuine rather than nominal 
contribution to society. Since this activity is still in progress, it 
will be difficult to resolve issues into final conclusions. Tentative 
assessments, however, will be in order. 
By following the broad outlines established by Albert Szymanski, 
one is quickly introduced to radical sociology. 2 In a type of "pre-
amble" to the movement this writer states: 
There is today a growing current of dissatisfaction with 
the state of contemporary sociology. Sociologists through-
out the country seem to be realizing that something is 
amiss. Young professors formulate or reformulate virtually 
every conceivable approach to sociological methodology and 
theory. Older professors defensively rewrite their earlier 
work. Students rebel against established notions, dis-
respectfully rejecting the work of teachers.3 
Szymanski, citing contemporary works by Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy 
(Monopoly Capital) and John Kenneth Galbraith (The New Industrial State), 
establishes the fact that the USA is dominated by "corporate capital-
ism." Another assumption made, in anticipation of developing a 




legitimation for the system 
4 
development of practical knowledge. 
This being the case, this writer refers to contemporary sociology 
as "corporate sociology" because it is a part of the corporate system. 
The two major preoccupations of corporate sociology include what this 
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writer refers to as "Abstracted Empiricism" and "Grand Theory." The 
former is preoccupied with the fetish of research and survey methods; 
the latter, the antithesis of the former, is personified by the work of 
Talcott Parsons and his "school" which is preoccupied with the formula-
tion and reformulation of concepts and models which have little connec-
tion with empirical research. Parsonian theory is evaluated as neither 
useful, insightful nor original. 5 
What does exist in the realm of applied sociology is funded largely 
for purposes of manipulation of the population. Thus politicians and 
corporations are eager for sociology to be "practical" so that they 
can have assistance in slaughtering ever more sheep for ever less costs 
and ever higher profits and taxes. Politicians, specifically, are eager 
to learn and to devise new ways of staying in power. Thus, with 
the success of "econometrics" the politicians and corporation managers 
wait in the wings for the development of "sociometrics," accurate and 
useful sociological knowledge to meet future contingencies of unemploy-
ment, housing, race riots, high crime rates and, perhaps, "children's 
lib. 116 
The built-in mechanism or assumption that social science has all 
the answers merely adds to the mystique so that many sociologists 
feel that they will soon have the answers. Meanwhile, in reading the 
same journals, attending the same meetings, doing similar research, 
the sociologist becomes more conservative. Dominant groups with 
linkage to the corporate world control the journals, the types of 
articles that will be published, the types of courses that will be 
offered and who will be promoted or invited to visit the "distinguished" 
universities; they are, in effect, the "gatekeepers" of sociology. 7 
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Enter, Radical Sociology! A simple formula is recognized. Make 
sociology responsible to the needs of society. In a broad sense the 
ideology is dichotomous: (1) something that may best be described as 
"the pursuit of understanding of the real nature of man and society 
' l' . ,,8 and (2) a commitment to the self-realization of human potentia ities. 
In addition to the above, the cross professionalism of bureau-
cratic, corporate socialism is to be relinquished in view of the 
total commitment of the radical sociologist. The new ethic is to 
include a driving curiosity to understand man combined with a healthy 
skepticism for all ideas both inside and outside of sociology. Most 
important of all, the radical sociologist is to encourage a compassion 
for people. In a general sense, what lies at the bot.tom of the new 
creed is c. Wright Mills and his expounding of the "sociological 
imagination." With Mills such questions as the structure of society 
and the nature of social change were foremost in view. It should be 
remembered, also, that much of Mills' theoretical work was an attempt 
by him to move sociology away from the yoke of Parsonian sterility. 
One of the questions not raised in this formulation is what of the 
other disciplines and faculties? Are they to remain conservative 
while sociology becomes radical? Many other questions could be raised 
by this controversy. 
It would appear that what Szymanski has in mind is in constructing 
a device to insure that the sociologist will not be alienated from 
social reality. He is emphatic when he exclaims that: "Radical 
sociologists ••• should accept nothing on faith and authority. Only 
that which can be demonstrated rigorously and clearly to each individual 
9 
should be accepted." He calls for professional sociologists to purge 
their minds of past experiences, in particular of sacred values. It 
is, of course, a problem of projection to determine where the new 
methods and concepts will come from. As for Szymanski the important 
consideration is that they not be derivative of corporate America. 
He also calls for laboratories on a 1:1 basis with classroom instruc-
tion and a rigid attempt to meet the personal needs of students. 
The future for the sociologist should be a bright and meaningful 
one. He should be a social critic, but he should also be able to 
relate to people and their problems. Szymanski sees the sociologist 
in the role of social engineer if not sociopathologist: 
One of the radical sociologist's major tasks is thu~ to 
analyze and elaborate the details of man's human nature 
and potentialities, and how they can be maximally ful-
filled. What are man's innate material and human needs, 
and what are the conditions of their satisfaction, i.e., 
what kinds of sexual arrangements, child rearing patterns, 
character structures, personal relations, economic organi-
zation, political forms, etc., would maximize the satis-
faction of man's needs, or the fulfillment of his 
potential?lO 
The radical sociologist, according to this source, should not 
hide behind the sacred myths of "objectivity" and the "making of 
value judgments." He or she should be armed with the tools of intel-
lectual honesty: 
••• a radical sociology must elaborate a counter 
definition of social reality. It must explain how 
badly the present society functions, how people's 
private frustrations stem from the social structure, 
how unnecessary and oppressive the present institu-
tional arrangements are, and how much better an 
alternative social order would work.11 
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There should be, then, a unity of political and social activities 
properly balanced by the radical sociologist and his proper service 
to his clients, members of society. It is not clear whether recipients 
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of the radical sociologist's services are to be students, citizens, 
or both. In essence, for Szymanski, the radical sociologist should 
live the life of a "radical intellectual" rather than as a "guilty 
• l" II • • ,,12 libera or union organizer. 
What radical sociology implies, in essence, is a turning around 
of the whole enterprise. Shades of Lester Frank Ward who at the turn 
of the century proposed a dichotomous sociology which would be divided 
into "pure" and "applied" divisions. Echoing Comte, Ward pointed 
out in 1906 that: 
Sociology has enabled us to orient ourselves in this great 
maze of human life, to see what the human race is, how it 
came into existence, approximately when and where it 
began, in what ways it has developed and advanced, and 
how it has come to be what we find it.13 
If there was a time that could be designated as the high water 
mark for radical sociology, it would probably be August, 1968, whef1 
the American Sociological Association was meeting in convention at 
Boston. This writer was present in the general assembly meeting when 
there was a sudden change in the program. This abberation was prompted 
by the radical wing of the A. S. A. What resulted was a most interest-
ing paper, if not proclamation, delivered by a young, serious-minded 
graduate student in sociology, Martin Nicolaus. Sociology was lam-
basted as propaganda. It was designated as a source of manpower for 
the official bureaucracy which has its national office in Washington, 
D. C., with a lobbyist who is paid twenty thousand dollars a year. 
Nicolaus continues: 
Radical and liberal sociologists have been fired without 
any spontaneous sign of interest or concern from the 
ASA. On the scholarly level, the drift to the right is 
observable in the pages of the ASA's official American 
Sociological Review, where the totalitarian implications 
of the functionalist method when coupled to techno-
logical means and modes of research can be studied in 
full theoretical bloom.14 
To support the ideology of radical sociology are many books and 
articles recognizing the need for a change of identity, David Horowitz 
speaks of using the wrong models to interpret American society. 
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Sidney Willhelm demonstrates that our society supports a racist ideology. 
There is much linkage to student revolt movements and the New Left. 
Bogdan Denitch, for example, sees the New Left as a "symptom of a major 
change in modern industrial society. 1115 
No one is better equipped to provide the bridge between radical 
sociology and the New Left than C. Wright Mills. In doing so he 
answers the "old women" of the "end of ideology" school by indicating 
that students are on the move again, call it utopian or whatever you 
desire! The crux of the Mills position is as follows: 
The Right means • celebrating society as it is, a 
going concern. Left means • • • structural criticism 
and reportage and theories of society, which at some 
point or another are focused politically as demands and 
programs. These criticisms, demands, theories, programs 
are guided morally by the humanist and secular idea of 
Western civilization--above all, reason and freedom and 
justice. "To be Left" means to connect up cultural with16 
political criticism, and both with demands and programs. 
Mills, in his now famous letter, offers "radical advice" to the 
movement. "Forget Victorian Marxism," he says, "except, whenever you 
need it; and read Lenin again (be careful)--Rosa Luxemburg, too • 
study . • . new generations of intellectuals around the world as real 
17 
live agencies of historic change." 
Noam Chomsky, another proponent of New Left policies, has a great 
deal to say which complements the Mills position. Intellectuals must 
be prepared to face repression. He is concerned, for example, with 
creating the future rather than experiencing an unrelated flow of 
events. He continues: 
The opportunities for intellectuals to take part in a 
genuine movement for social change are many and varied, 
and I think that certain general principles are clear. 
They must be willing to face facts and refrain from 
erecting convenient fantasies • • • . They must avoid 
the temptation to join the repressive elite ••. ,18 
Throughout the literature on the "movement" there is a feeling 
of frustration or acute alienation. Concomitantly, there is also 
noted a linkage or identification with other movements. Incidents, 
strikes whether by students or industrial workers, wars which are 
considered unjust, inequities in justice displayed to youth, women, 
blacks and other minorities, are all included in this category. It 
is the system which is at fault and those who support the system are 
opportunists and lackeys. 
Michael Harrington's views on this are as follows: 
The great gift which the New Left received from the Negro 
movement and, in turn, transmitted to the collegiate 
young of the middle class, was a sense of social out-
rage • • • . The New Left applied this civil rights emotion 
and attitude to the problem of poverty, and then to the war 
in Vietnam. The result was an existential, moralistic, 
and quite emotional critique of the entire society and, 
in particular, a sense that the self-proclaimed reformers 
and social changers were hypocrites for maneuvering 
within the framework of the possible when what the times 
called for was a nonviolent John Brown.19 
Thus, for whatever purpose it may originally have intended to 
serve, the rude awakening is that most sociologists, with all due 
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respect to the New Left, are affiliated with colleges and universities 
largely dominated by state and federal funding agencies. Consequently, 
to keep working, the sociologist with radical inclination is encouraged 
to fit into a particular mold, bureaucratic in scope, conservative 
with regards to social change and political experimentation. 
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But, equally important as the above, the ideology of New Left 
politics and radical sociological professionalization is not a mirage 
on the horizon. It is a social reality in its own right fortified 
by the legend of the Haight-Asbury "Diggers" of San Francisco and 
the stimulating, if not tragic, folklore of contemporary communes 
in remote rural parts of the United States. 
Gains have been made to some extent in that there has been ful-
fillment in regards to the Vietnam war, a complete public humiliation 
on the part of purveyors of u. s. foreign policy. Students have 
rights. Blacks, although heard from more frequently, are still poor 
and out of the mainstream of American life. 
The ideology of New Left politics may be a sleeping giant or it 
may go away as Nixon and Agnew did without really changing anything. 
Perhaps sociology professors will not discourage undergraduate 
students in the future who say that they desire to study sociology 
because they want to help people. It may dawn on the sociological 
technician that the computer is not the finalization of his calling; 
people and their problems are much more significant. 
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CHAPTER VII 
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES 
Peter Berger, in formulating a theoretical position for the 
sociology of knowledge, reminds us that "every society contains a 
repertoire of identities that is part of the 'objective knowledge' 
of its members. 111 To a large extent these are commonplace assumptions 
made within the various segments of society at any given time. These 
may be considered "internalized" values within the individual. Using 
the central ideas of Cooley and Mead, Berger establishes the following 
dialectic: 
Self and society are inextricably interwoven entities. 
Their relationship is dialectical because the self, 
once formed, may act back in its turn upon the society 
that shaped it • • • • The self exists by virtue of 
society, but society is only possible as many selves 
continue to apprehend themselves and each other with 
reference to it. 2 
Society, according to the logic developed by Berger, is genuinely 
capable not only of generating social structure for its subsistence, 
but it is also capable of spinning off social worlds of thought and 
value processes or codes by which men live their lives in an effort to 
gain purpose and status. Stated in other terms: "Society not only 
defines but creates psychological reality. 113 Among the more dominant 
"social worlds" which have strong ideological tendencies are the 
economic and the political areas; in fact, just as many persons identify 
sociology with problems, the same can be said for a strong identification 
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with ideology as that which has to do with the economic and political 
phenomena. Once this is established, it is easier to see the various 
gradients or degrees of liberality or conservatism within each of these 
ideological areas. 
One can build a rather strong case for this argument as projected 
above for, as Berger points out: 
Socialization is only possible if, as Mead put it, the 
individual "takes the attitude" of others, that is, 
relates to himself as others have first related to him. 
This process, of course, extends to the establishment 
or identity itself, so that one may formulate that 
social identification both precedes and produces self-
identification. 4 
It is somewhat reasonable to assume from the above that it is 
possible to build a dialectic without Marx, although some would feel 
on more secure ideological grounds by referring to Marx. There are 
others who believe that it is necessary to go beyond Marx. Popper 
has pointed out, emphatically, that sociologists oftentimes do not 
know where their dialectic is coming from. His position is as 
follows: 
How little the sociologists of knowledge have succeeded 
in socio-therapy, that is to say, in eradicating their 
own total ideology, will be particularly obvious if we 
consider their relation to Hegel. For they have no idea 
that they are just repeating him; on the contrary, they 
believe not only that they have outgrown him, but also 
that they have successfully seen through him, socio-
analyzed him; and that they can now look at him not from 
any particular social habitat, but objectively, from a 
superior elevation. This palpable failure in self-
analysis tells us enough.s 
Despite any shortcomings of the sociology of knowledge as per-
ceived by Popper, Berger is on solid ground when he incorporates it 
into the school of symbolic interaction. He elaborates his position 
by showing that: 
One may expand the Meadian phrase, then, by saying that 
the individual takes the world of others as he takes their 
attitudes and roles. Each role implies a world. The 
self is always located in a world. The same process of 
socialization generates the self and internalizes the 
world to which this self belongs.6 
First, the important thing to note in the context of this dis-
cussion is that sociology has placed far more emphasis in the past 
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on the "cult of objectivity" than in drawing the type of conclusions 
reached by Berger above. Secondly, there has been a conspiracy of 
silence in sociology attributed to "political" and "economic" areas 
in general. True, the introductory text books do speak of the several 
"social institutions" but, for the most part, in a cursory, subdued 
manner. Thirdly, there has been an attempt to link economic and 
political concerns with "Marxism" and "Marxism" with ideology. Thus, 
the end product has been the type of confusion which is about as far 
removed from objectivity as one can possibly imagine. 
In carrying this projection to a higher level one is astounded 
to learn that: 
The indoctrination of American intellectuals with the 
ideology that social science consists of "the counting of 
things" has left most of them unprepared to understand how 
the nose of American imperialism, the most powerful in 
history, can be tweaked by communists in Asia or colonels 
in South America.7 
Social science and sociology, in particular, is certainly more 
than a play on numbers. It is the thesis of this essay that economic 
and political ideologies are primary in their influence, particularly 
in a democratic society, although they may be arrested somewhat in a 
totalitarian society. This is done in order to make two assumptions 
that should be clarified at this point: (1) that ot-h(~r "icleoloqi<~s" 
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are secondary when ranked with those of the economic and the political 
and (2) that democracy is a stable category. A distinguished writer 
has recently challenged the latter in the following manner: 
[democracy] has become a subject of ideological 
debate ••• the term makes two points about political 
system which it is used to describe: one is that the 
system possesses a more or less determinate set of 
characteristics which may be taken to constitute "rule 
by the people;" the other is that the system deserves 
to be commended.a 
The implications of Professor Skinner's critique of democracy is 
that it is a special type of political ideology. Much can and does 
depend on who is defining the concept and under what conditions. The 
same could be said insofar as purpose is concerned, such as indoctrina-
tion, propaganda, militarism, patriotism or civic pride. It should 
be stated that America has no equivalent of Leninism, and its revolu-
tion was two hundred years ago as compared to fifty-two years for the 
USSR. Old revolutions are not conducive to sharp ideological conf igu-
rations, which may account for much of the dissent and lack of social 
solidarity in the present American society. 
Much could be said about social stratification and the central 
ideologies of politics and economics; Paul Jacobs adequately de-
scribes, for example, what it means to be poor in America. How, as 
one may anticipate, purchasing a car by a middle-class American is 
relatively a simple matter when compared to the same transaction for 
the poor man. Also, the more than incidental differences in housing, 
food, health and recreation. The poor, according to Jacobs are taken 
by the "mouse house" (loan company) and the private money order company 
since most poor pay bills by cash rather than by check and at a much 
more regular rate than their middle-class counterpart. The poor are 
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9 "losers" in America with little legislation going for them. Do they 
uphold the same ideologies? 
To expand on the democracy theme one must take into consideration 
historical conditions and social change. E. H. Carr has summarized 
this quite well as follows: 
Modern democracy, as it grew up and spread from its focus 
in western Europe over the past three centuries, rested on 
three main propositions: first, that the individual con-
science is the ultimate source of decisions about what is 
right and wrong; second, that there exists between differ-
ent individuals a fundamental harmony of interests strong 
enough to enable them to live peacefully together in society; 
third, that where action has to be taken in the name of 
society, rational discussion between individuals is the 
best method of reaching a decision on that action. Modern 
democracy is, in virtue of its origins, individualistic, 
optimistic and rational. The three main propositions on 
which it is based have all been seriously challenged in the 
contemporary world.lo 
Professor Carr, with some prompting from Max Weber and Karl 
Marx, sees the continuation of democracy in the future more at the 
collectivist than at the individualistic level. He stipulates: 
Mass democracy calls just as much as individualist 
democracy for an educated society as well as for 
responsible and courageous leaders; for it is only 
thus that the gap between leaders and masses, which 11 
is the major threat to mass democracy, can be bridged. 
It is interesting to note that Professor Carr's book, originally based 
on radio broadcasts delivered over stations of the British Broadcasting 
Company, was on the recommended reading list published by c. Wright 
Mills prior to his death. 12 The important point for purposes of this 
analysis is that the above summary is one which allows both for 
ideology and shades of opinion. 
A sociological formulation of an economic or political ideology 
is usually developed in a sophisticated, implicit manner. It may or 
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may not be at the conscious level. For all practical purposes, the 
way that one identifies with political and economic conditions, ide''.)-
logically, will color, if not contaminate, one's writing and teaching. 
For sociology as a discipline and for sociologists as professionals, 
there are some interesting bench marks and points of departure. 
Irving Louis Horowitz has, for example, made an interesting three-
way comparison of how ranking sociologists employ the works of Max 
Weber in their respective orientations: 
• Weber was instrumental in opening up a vast 
network of problems handled quite differently by 
Parsons, Merton, and Mills. Weber became in American 
sociological history the form of legitimation fot the 
conservatism of a Parsons, but no less for the iiberal-
ism of a Merton and the radicalism of a Mills.13 
In another context which has important ideological overtones for 
sociology, Professor Horowitz states: "To be a Parsonian became for a 
long time the only way a person in American sociology could tolerably 
deal with big issues without being condemned as a Marxist. 1114 This 
statement was made at a time when to be labeled a Marxist was to be 
designated an outcast. 
Noting that Marxism pioneered developmental "models" in sociology, 
Horowitz, in a more recent article, warns that, "Though the ideologist 
does not consider the ethical question whether development is worthwhile 
or needed, he must still evaluate the worth of available types of 
15 
development." 
Professor Horowitz states his case more specifically: 
The ideologists tend to obfuscate and distort fundamental 
similarities between systems for the sake of preserving 
the separateness of their own, whether it be called "The 
American Way" or "The Communist Road." Ideologists tend 
also to assume a world of total voluntarism, as if human 
development were dictated exclusively by choice and 
consensus, without limitation imposed by national 
boundaries, traditions, political systems, or economic 
potential. If the sociologist is not himself to become 
an ideologist, he must cut through the ideological 
rhetoric and search out areas of convergence as well 
as differentiation. At the same time, due recognition 
must be accorded the role of ideology in defining 
developmental goals.16 
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Horowitz utilizes a statement by Sorokin in attempting to clarify 
the problem of ideology as it applies to developmental areas. It is 
Sorokin's position that, left to their own resources, scientists from 
both the USA and USSR could mutually profit from the scientific dis-
. 1 . . f h h 17 coveries as we 1 as inventions o eac ot er. 
The important resolution at this juncture is that ideological 
considerations are important and they are not to be ignored or assumed 
to be homogeneous. In some respects the ideology is the prior or 
antecedent variable to be considered in any configuration of social 
relationships. For sociology it is important to see, as Horowitz has 
indicated above, what the role of ideology meant for such distinguished 
sociologists as Parsons, Merton and Mills, based, of course, on their 
writings. 
Judging from the position of radical sociology and New Left poli-
tics, Parsons is persona non grata for the "thinking" sociologist. 
It is interesting to note that despite the wide differences between 
Parsons and Mills, that according to Gouldner, they also exhibit con-
sensus in regards to some critical issues. Gouldner states: 
In effect, Parsons comes surprisingly close to agreement 
with some of the most fundamental conclusions which 
C. Wright Mills had arrived at. The critical difference 
between them on this involves primarily not the empirical 
imputations about what is happening to the structure of 
power in the United States, but rather the legitimacy of 
this development and of the new power elite itself. 18 
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For purposes of this study, with all due respect to Professor 
Gouldner's position, we can remark that there are decided "ideological" 
differences between Parsons and Mills. Parsons, of course, is a 
scholar of many "moods" if not many "revisions." Looking at some of 
his more recent works is most revealing. 
Beginning with a negative note, Parsons shows that with respect 
to Marxism and developing countries: "An ideology of political activism 
must also focus the blame for the parlous state of society, often 
· · · "d h f · 1119 eventuating in a semi-paranoi t eory o conspiracy. In other 
essays dealing more specifically with the problem, it is not too 
unrealistic to say that what Parsons is attempting to do is to subvert 
ideology to his already well-known theories of social system and social 
action. 
Ideology, using a watered down version of the Mannheim model, 
fits into the paradigm of "institutionalization." He explains in the 
following example how it is to be employed: 
Thus the business ideology, for instance, substantially 
exaggerates the contribution of businessmen to the national 
welfare and underplays the contribution of scientists and 
professional men. And in the current ideology of the 
"intellectuals," the importance of social "pressures to 
conform" is exaggerated, and institutional factors in the 
freedom of the individual are ignored or played down. 20 
At times it appears as though Parsons is not taking ideology into 
consideration at all but that he is merely putting in place those 
elements of the "social system" which have some bearing on "power." 
It is "power," then, that is important to the system rather than a 
distortion if not a complete obliteration of Mannheim's "ideology." 
An example of this process of synthesizing to oblivion is the following 
as Parsons insists on levels of analysis: 
in considering an ideology, values must be specified 
to the level of different subsystems of the society, like 
businessmen or intellectuals, and the degree of their com-
patability with each of the noncultural components . 21 
llO 
Parsons in his many theoretical sociological studies never really 
comes to grips with the core of ideology although much of his conserva-
tive political and economic tendencies are manifest in his philosophy 
of Grand Theory. Statements such as the following are good representa-
tions of the above: " our concern in discussing ideologies is 
with deviance from an ideal type defined by a value-science integrate 
,,22 
The proof of Parsons' ideological conservatism is to be found in 
the fact that the majority of New Left and radical sociologists single 
him out as the culprit of do-nothing, conservative sociology. In Max 
Weber, as the student of sociology may plainly see, Parsons had found 
his substitute for Marx as well as Mannheim. Thus, one finds this 
sort of reasoning in Parsons' more recent studies: 
.•• Weber's capacity to handle the relations between 
cultural movements and social organization in an 
historical and comparative context was such that a 
return to utilitarian modes of thought seems equally 
out of the question.23 
C. Wright Mills, in his own prosaic style, has explained the 
Parsonian position on ideology quite well. He addresses, generally, 
Parsons and his followers: 
The Grand Theorists represent a partially organized 
attempt to withdraw from the effort plainly to describe, 
explain, and understand human conduct and society: in 
turgid prose they set forth the disordered contents 
of their reading of eminent nineteenth-century sociolo-
gists, and in the process mistake their own beginnings 
for a finished result. 24 
Looking at ideology and the sociology of knowledge from the 
liberal point of view is Robert K. Merton, a student of both Parsons 
and Sorokin. The statement might be made here that Merton spends 
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more time critiquing Mannheim and Marx than in consciously employing 
these theoretical constructs. One may see ideological characteristics 
involved in Merton's "manifest and latent functions" as well as his 
"self-fulfilling prophecy," but these are more incidental than 
purposive. 
Striking out on a structural-functional format, one observes 
Merton finding much fault with Mannheim. He says in regards to this 
that, "Mannheim's analysis is limited . • by his failure to specify 
the type or mode of relations between social structure and knowledge.•~ 5 
Projecting along these lines Merton uncovers other defects centering 
on "causation," "interest assumptions," "focus of attention," "pre-
conditions" rather than "necessary conditions" and thi= problems 
inherent in such qualifying terms as "compatibility," "congruity," 
"harmony," "consistency" and "contrariety. 1126 
One has the feeling that Merton discovered the sociology of 
knowledge and ideology too late in life to fit them into the scheme 
of functionalism despite the fact that much of his findings are like 
one of his favorite expressions, "serendipity," which, when recognized 
as "uncommon unexpectations" also do not have any particular place to 
hide within the "system." Merton, the great defepder of the "socio-
logical position" in the New York Times and at various prestigious 
"world congresses" over the years is a "late bloomer" as far as the 
use and implementation of ideology is concerned. He spends a great 
deal of time explaining "power," citing quite often the works of 
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Daniel Bell, and less than a page in his seven hundred page "major 
sociological contribution" explaining the "welfare state." A student 
of sociology should question a major scholar's great preoccupation 
with "prediction" and, concomitantly, his limited interest in the 
"sociology of knowledge" which establishes procedures for an interpre-
tation of the past. What sense can prediction of the future make if 
we are hazy about the past and confused about the present? How many 
contemporary scholars, including Merton, can adequately explain how 
our social institutions have evolved other than to apply labels such 
as "European Tradition" or "Colonial Policy" or "Frontier Heritage"? 
How many who are presently keen on the game of tennis know that there 
was a rise and fall of this sport in France during the Middle Ages? 
How many experts in "juvenile delinquency" are aware that there was 
no such problem in Europe during this same period? 27 
It is interesting to note where Theodore Roszak places Merton in 
his recent critique of American society: 
It is along such lines, following the equation science 
Reason = all good things, that Karl Popper, Joseph Needham, 
J. Bronowski, C. P. Snow, and Robert K. Merton have iden-
tified the scientific temperament as the secret of the 
democratic "open society" • • • impersonal knowing is 
the strongest defense of personal right. 28 
Third in this category of sociologists who see different "meanings" 
in the same Max Weber is C. Wright Mills who still represents the 
radical posture of American sociology. One can say considerably more 
about Mills who despite his untimely death in 1962 still remains very 
much the "sociologist of knowledge." 
It is interesting to show what kind of harassment Mills was sub-
jected to during his own lifetime. The following is a critical review 
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of one of his most significant books, The Power Elite, as reviewed by 
29 
Talcott Parsons: 
•.• in this, as in some of his previous writings, Mills' 
general tone toward both men and institutions is sharply 
caustic. The Power Elite certainly purports to be an 
exposition and an explanation of what has been happening 
in American society, but it is equally an indictment. 
There is no pretense of even trying to maintain a scien-
tific neutrality; the book is a fiery and sarcastic attack 
on the pretensions of the "higher circles" in America, 
either to competence in exercise of their responsibilities, 
or to moral legitimation of their position.30 
In effect, the concept of power elite for Mills was ideological 
in scope with broad support in empirical findings and social class 
as well as elite formations. It is not an oversimplification to 
argue, for example, that Mills would expect Parsons or even Merton to 
understand his position. Judged from critiques of one another's 
books and articles, Mills understood them better than they understood 
him. For Mills, the social scientist must not only think, but he 
must also act. It is necessary, for Mills, to know exactly what 
Marx stands for without all of the propaganda to the contrary. An 
example of Mills ideological thinking is as follows: 
A political philosophy tells us how to find out where we 
stand and where we may be going; it gives us some answers 
to these questions; it prepares us for the possible 
futures. To examine any political philosophy, then, we 
must examine it as an ideology, a statement of ideals, a 
designation of agency or agencies, and as a set of social 
theories •••• As ideology, liberalism and marxism have 
both been made vulgar and banal; each supplies cliches for 
the defense of a great power state and for the abuse of 
the other bloc and all its works.31 
Mills continues with his discussion of ideology: 
Ideology, as the public face of a political philosophy, 
very often becomes simply myth or folklore; very often 
too, even a minimum of ideology withers away: all that 
i ~; l c'f t- is an empty <1nd irrelevant rhetoric. Such 
ideological message as may once have prevailed is no 
longer persuasive. Indeed, it even becomes difficult 
to state clearly.32 
One notes a difference here in using ideology as the face of 
political philosophy instead of finding fault with Mannheim and 
speculating on what he really had in mind when he wrote Ideology and 
Utopia. Mills bypasses Mannheim and goes directly to the source, 
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Marx, whom he sees as a humanitarian, a moralist and a thinker of the 
highest rational magnitude. Mills formulates a sharp oversimplication 
of the Marxian ideology which spells out in no uncertain terms: "You 
33 
do not have to be poor any longer!" Compare this to the "conserva-
tism" of a Parsons or the "liberalism" of a Merton and you can hardly 
find the person trapped in the "social system" or "functional 
requisites." 
In another book Mills uses his ideological insights to warn the 
great powers. He exclaims: 
Our politics, in short, must be the politics of responsi-
bility. 0ur basic charge against the systems of both the 
United States and the u.s.s.R. must be that in differing 4 
ways they both live by the politics of irresponsibility. 3 
The above may be considered technical statements about ideology. 
A more general statement is as follows: 
Nowadays men everywhere seek to know where they stand, 
where they may be going, and what--if anything--they can 
do about the present as history and the future as respon-
sibility. Such questions as these no one can answer once 
and for all. Every period provides for its own answers 
• • • . I also mean that our major orientations (ideologies) 
--liberalism and socialism--have virtually collapsed as 
adequate explanations of the world and of ourselves. 35 
Thus, the insights and positions of three of America's outstanding 
sociologists have been reviewed for their ideological posture on 
economic and political matters. Parsons appears to give the least 
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attention to the subject since he is the least internationally oriented 
of the three. It is interesting to compare him, specifically, to 
Sorokin who uses sociology of knowledge, with or without ideology as 
his basic frame of reference. Parsons' major stumbling block appears 
to be the concept of social system (two persons to a nation-state) 
which is so technically ambiguous that it ignores basic issues and 
values which are important to man and to society. 
Merton, on the other hand, prefers to shadow box with Mannheim 
and ends up proving little that was not already well-known about 
ideology and the sociology of knowledge. What he ends up doing is 
constructing a "Paradigm for the Sociology of Knowledge" which is 
centered around the following questions: 
(1) Where is the existential basis of mental productions 
located? 
(2) What mental productions are being sociologically 
analyzed? 
(3) How are mental productions related to the existential 
basis? 
(4) Why? (sic) manifest and latent functions imputed to 
these existentially conditioned mental productions. 
(5) When do the imputed readings of the existential 
base and knowledge obtain?36 
It does not appear that Merton is quite as successful with this 
model as that which he has constructed for "social structure and 
anomie." Judging from space allocation in his major study he has 
given far more space to the latter than he has given to the former. 
In a way he buries "ideology" along with "moral beliefs," "philosophy," 
"religious beliefs," "social norms," "positive science" and "tech-
nology" which can create more problems than it can solve. The "method" 
proves hopelessly bogged down in what might be a type of American formal 
sociology that has arrived on the scene too late with too little. 
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Mills is much more attuned to ideology than Parsons who is 
enamored with his own brand of hubris and Merton who, in most respects, 
acts and writes as though he is embarrassed by having discovered 
ideology and the sociology of knowledge after he embraced anomie and 
incorporated it into "theories of the middle-range." There is no 
"middle-range" for Mills. There is, instead, man and society and all 
that stands in the way of productivity, harmony and purpose in life. 
These values exist. They are the "social worlds" of which Berger 
speaks derivative of Mead and Cooley and their basic frame of refer-
ence, symbolic interaction. But, this symbolic interaction, according 
to how it is interpreted by Mills, is not going to spring full circle 
at us just by giving lip service to it. Nor is the good life going to 
happen by rejecting great philosophies without hearing them out 
properly. 
A good example of how Mills resolved the "ideological problem" 
of Marxism is as follows: 
I happen never to have been what is called "a Marxist," 
but I believe Karl Marx one of the most astute students 
of society modern civilization has produced; his work 
is now essential equipment of any adequately trained 
social scientist as well as of any properly educated 
person. 37 
To project even to a greater degree, Mills was concerned about 
the lack of first rate scholars in the second half of the twentieth 
century who could carry on the work of the masters of the nineteenth 
century of which Marx is a product. There were no new Max Webers on 
the scene in his estimation and those who gravitated to Parsons and 
Grand Theory did not adequately understand either the problem or the 
mission. 
Perhaps a scholar of the magnitude of a Mills is tall enough, 
intellectually, to work around the stigma inherent in Marxism. How 
often do we hear in classroom situations and read in textbooks that 
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if we accept Marxism that there is nothing further for the professor 
to explain? How ridiculous a position this turns out to be. A simple 
formulation of Marxism is that it is half concerned with "economic 
determinism" and half concerned with "ideology." This being the case 
(and this is actually bypassing much of importance in Marxism) all 
that is needed for some recognition is that the ideological part is 
most sociological in scope and nature. After all, the philosophical 
position is already taken. The economic position is nothing more than 
the engine tracking social relationships through historical eras and 
periods. It is, however, for the sociologist to examine the class 
structure of a society. Hasn't this been done by W. Lloyd Warner 
and his students as well as by psychologists, historians and archae-
ologists? Hasn't this subject of social class been one of the more 
popular debates in sociology based on the Davis-Moore hypothesis? How 
many sociologists, for example, have been concerned enough to read 
Gunnar Landtman's Origin of the Inequality of Social Classes? Much 
more, indeed, could be said of this issue. 
It is, thus, Mills, despite his many excursions into pragmatic 
backroads, who has the closest approximation to a sociological formu-
lation of economic and political ideologies. What is more simple than 
"social worlds" of purpose and value linking man to society in a 
manner of time and place perspective? Essentially, this is what the 
work of Mills suggests. Mills asks for a reconstruction of reality 
including Mead's whole man (both "I" and "me"). Mills asks us to 
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separate propaganda from ideology and to investigate the dominant 
philosophies extant because their teaching has meaning and purpose 
when given proper application. Mills relegates "value judgments" 
and their taboo dimensions by social scientists to the ash can of 
academia. Mills asks for a new set of norms to evaluate knowledge. 
Mills encourages the sociologist to pioneer new ideologies of purpose 
rather than to be afraid of deviation from the norm of conservatism. 
Put in different terms, if we do not develop new ideologies, we will 
be stuck with worn out, meaningless ideologies. 
One who sees "philosophy" largely as "politics" and who writes 
in a tradition akin to Mills is Herbert Marcuse. A splendid rendition 
of how our society operates with a set of obsolete ideologies is the 
following: 
Late industrial society has increased rather than reduced 
the need for parasitical and alienated functions •••• 
Advertising, public relations, indoctrination, planned 
obsolescence are no longer unproductive overhead costs but 
rather elements of basic production costs. In order to be 
effective, such production of socially necessary waste 
requires continuous rationalization -- the relentless utili-
zation of advanced techniques and science. Consequently, 
a rising standard of living is the almost unavoidable by-
product of the politically manipulated industrial societ~, 
once a certain level of backwardness has been overcome. 3 
A complementary statement by Mills on this same ideological theme 
is as follows: 
The old social anchors of individual freedom and individual 
security of small scattered properties and small-scale 
communities are gone; the roots of these values in autono-
mously operating institutions are dried up; the seat of 
rationality is no longer unambiguously the individual; the 
centers of power are as often hidden as explicit.40 
Thus, the heritage of a Mills is long lasting and is not confined 
within the arbitrary walls of one discipline. What this represents is 
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a concrete case for the sociologist to break out of his or her 
"non-ideological" shell and to resume the work instituted by such 
founding fathers as Comte, Spencer, Marx, Ward and Sumner. Despite 
their ideological differences they never lost sight of man's position 
in society. It is a major source of embarrassment in our day to 
have sociological ideas exploited and contaminated by such ideologically 
oriented writers as Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Margaret Mead, Herbert 
Marcuse, Kenneth Boulding and others. It is as though it would be 
more important to hold a Ph. D. in history in order to write a socio-
logical treatise. This happens to be the case not only for Moynihan 
but also for Staughton Lynd and Theodore Roszak. It might help also 
to be grounded in economics like Boulding or in biology like Commaner 
and Ehrlich. There is probably more good sociology in one issue of 
the New York Review of Books than in a whole semester of college level 
. t d . l 41 in ro uctory socio ogy. There are, from time to time, sociologists 
included in various issues but more than likely it will be someone 
from Oxford, England, or Cambridge, Massachusetts, or, perhaps, the 
New York City intellectual establishment some of whom are not only 
non-sociological but, as may be anticipated, anti-sociological. Much 
of this dilemma we may attribute to the sociologist being too preoc-
cupied with "method" and having failed to do his ideological homework. 
Of course, leadership or charisma, as Max Weber has indicated, is 
important in leading social movements. Perhaps the death of Mills has 
left sociology in an ideological vacuum which is, as yet, awaiting 
replacement and rejuvenation. 
There may be other reasons for that which may be termed "idea-
logical drift." Although there is no one central answer, one 
significant suggestion is made by David Riesman and Michael Maccoby. 
They contend that: 
There has never been in American life anything comparable 
to the Fabian Society. Woodrow Wilson and Franklin 
Roosevelt gathered around them an ad hoc team of advisers 
who included a number of bright lawyers, economists, and 
political scientists, but neither these nor their journal-
istic and academic allies created anything like an ethos 
or a basis for interpreting the relation between specific 
pragmatic measures and over-all social and political 
change.42 
This same "ideological drift" or lack of consciousness on the 
part of American sociologists is manifested in the following quota-
tion from Horowitz. If the cultural ideas of Riesman and Maccoby 
may be envisioned as "cause" the Horowitz thesis may be taken as 
"effect." Horowitz states the following: 
Why is it that sociology in the United States has been 
delinquent in forging a general theory of social devel-
opment? Historically, sociologists were pioneers in 
precisely this field. Ferdinand Toennies' remarkable 
typology of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft socio-cultural 
structures is at its source an historical account of the 
machinery through which community-agrarian patterns dis-
solved and gave way to a societal-industrial pattern. 
Toennies' description of European capitalism still forms 
the basis for much discussion of what a developed society 
necessarily includes and excludes ••• [thus] ••• 
the problem of development was uppermost in the minds of 
the "classical" sociologists.43 
Other "classical" sociologists named by Horowitz as being in the 
same class and having similar developmental interests comparable to 
Toennies are Max Weber, Werner Sombart, Georg Simmel, w. I. Thomas, 
Florian Znaniecki and Karl Mannheim. In answer to his own question 
Horowitz seems to think that the rise of socialism has confounded and 
confused sociologists. This appears to be a good explanation and 
may account for the great preoccupation of operationalism and metho-
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dology. Thus, the contemporary American sociologist envisions himself 
as an alienated "answer man" rather than as a leader (in and out of 
the university) with a purpose in the community. Other reasons may 
include the threat of political intimidation should he take a stand 
and the so-called success model of the corporation where individuals 
get lost amidst products and promotions. 
that: 
Michael Harrington adds to the confused picture when he states 
For now, there is the crisis of belief and disbelief. The 
simultaneous undermining of confidence in the two Western 
ideals of man was parallel to, and related to, the decline 
of both the capitalist and socialist ideologies. So there 
is a massive intersection of uncertainties, a time of 
interregnum [pause] and indeterminancy.44 
In his recent book on social reform Arthur B. Shostak attempted 
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to place contemporary intellectuals into four categories: "conserva-
tive," "liberal," "radical," and "visionary. 1145 Without going too 
much into the issues involved, the following names are placed into the 
above ideological subdivisions along with the publications associated 
with each group. 
Reversing the above order and searching for sociologists, one 
begins with the "visionaries." According to Shostak these include 
Edgar z. Friedenberg, Norman Brown, R. D. Laing, Abraham Maslow, 
Theodore Roszak, Arthur Waskow, Alan Watts and Germaine Greer. Perhaps 
the name of Friedenberg in this list is best known as a sociologist 
although Roszak, a historian, is assumed to be a sociologist of the 
"air conditioned nightmare." The principle theme noted here is to 
prompt mankind to rejoin history. Among the publications within 
which they frequently publish are The Mother Earth News, Manas, 
Commonweal (a Catholic magazine) and Futures Unconditional. Their 
major preoccupation, according to Shostak, is to encourage a renais-
sance in values and man's mission on earth. 
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The second group are the "radicals" and among this cadre of 
intellectuals and ideologues are Gary Marx, Richard Flacks, Michael 
Harrington, Eugene D. Genovese, Paul Goodman, Paul Sweezy, and Angela 
Davis. The latter two are representatives of the American Conununist 
Press. C. Wright Mills would qualify for this group were he still 
alive. Goodman, an interesting and introspective writer of the 1950's 
and 1960's, known for his Growing Up Absurd died within the past year. 46 
The first two names on the list are sociologists. The central motif 
of this group is "revolution" and their principle means of explanation 
is via economics and ideology. Publications to which they contribute 
include The Nation, Monthly Review, Ramparts, New Society and Telos. 
Third come the "liberals" who have been using the Vietnam War 
in recent years as their main vehicle along with the "promise of world 
peace." They also have an active interest in remaking history in 
their image with a strong program of "science" and "technology" 
included for good measure. Among the publications which invite their 
offerings are The Progressive, Atlantic, Harper's, Saturday Review, 
The New Republic and America. Among them are some of the best known 
contemporary sociologists: Seymour Martin Lipset, Daniel Bell, John 
Kenneth Galbraith, Herbert Gans, Irving Howe, Edward Kennedy, Bayard 
Rustin, Harriet Van Horne and Nathan Glazer. 
The fourth group are the "conservatives" who exhibit a mild form 
of distrust of their fellow man. From time to time their articles are 
to be found in The National Review, The New Leader, The Public Interest, 
Time and Commentary (a Jewish publication). Their collective views 
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on reform refer yOu to "the good old days." Their names include 
Irving Kristal, William F. Buckley, Jr., William Chamberlain, Theodore 
Hess, Russell Kirk, Jerome Tuccil le, Ernst Van Dan Haag and Ayn Rand. 
Shostak admits that this list is incomplete and that hi s samp le 
is small. He questions his typologies as to their validity . Missing, 
of course , are prominent publications like the New York Times and 
Newsweek. There has also b een a great deal of sociological material 
of late in the Wall Street Journal and Fortune. Last, nothing is said 
about the journals and whether or not they favor radical or conserva-
tive type articles. How does one classify a statistical article? 
Nevertheles.s, the Shostak typologies have some merit for this analysis. 
It is interesting at this point to single out one of the promi-
nent sociologists above and to look into the reasons why he has toned 
down his radicalism. Nathan Glazer who worked for the government in 
Washington says: 
I learned, to my surprise, that most of the radical ideas 
my fr.iends and I were suggesting had already been thought 
of, considered, analyzed , and had problems in their imple-
mentation that we had never dreamed of . I learned to 
respect many of the men who worked in the huge bureaucra-
cies, who limited their own freedom, and who made it possi-
ble occasionally for the radical ideas of others to be 
implemented. I learned that the difficulty with many 
radical ideas lay in the fact that so many varied interests 
played a role in government, and that most of them were 
legitimate interests.47 
Another list for brief mention includes all of the authors who 
reviewed C. Wright Mills' Power Elite. 48 Here the categories are 
three: "liberal," "radical" and "highbrow." The liberal critic s 
include Robert A. Dahl, William Kornhauser, Talcott Parsons, Dennis 
H. Wrong and A. A. Berle, Jr. The radical critics are Robert S. 
Lynd , Paul M. Sweezy and He rber t Aptheker. The third and last c ategory, 
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highbrow, implies those critics, according to Mills, who were above 
it all. These included Philip Riaff, Richard Revere and Daniel Bell. 
One may question why Parsons is placed among the liberals when he is 
generally considered more in the conservative camp. It is difficult to 
expect labels to always be consistent. It will be interesting to see, 
for example, how radical some of the student protesters of the late 
1960's and early 1970's will be when they gain some type of professional 
status. 
The next consideration is to briefly review what, in essence, 
are the principle American ideologies. According to one group of 
writers, they can be enumerated as follows: "capitalism," "liberalism," 
"reform liberalism," "conservatism," "minority liberation," "women's 
liberation," "the New Left" and "Marxism and Socialism. 1149 The latter 
category includes the "welfare state." It is their contention that, 
"these selections represent the major dimensions of the leading systems 
50 of thought in the United States of the 1970's." 
Although this list is not exhaustive by any means it does pro-
vide for a good representation of current ideologies. One notices 
the absence of religious and racist ideologies, even though the latter 
may be contained under both "minority liberation" and the "New Left." 
The important point to make here is that these central ideological 
themes rest largely on political and economic considerations. Sheldon 
Wolin has explained this quite well when he said : 
Political society does not experience "disease," but 
conflict. It is not overrun with harmful bacteria, but 
"individuals with hopes, ambitions, and fears" that are 
often at odds with the plans of other individuals; its 
end is not "health," but the endless search for a founda-
tion that will support the mass of contradictions present 
in society.51 
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One is astounded by the absence of sociologists as contributors 
to the above. Names such as Abe Fortas, Milton Friedman and Walter 
Lippman are not known in American politics and economics for the ir 
ideological postures , but their essays are main-stays i n this volume. 
In a companion volume these same writers explain their position more 
fully: 
We shall try to • • • avoid the mistakes of the "end of 
ideology'' thesis as well as its antithesis--overestimation 
of the significance of ideological conflict . . . the 
character and development of ideologies must be studied 
from an impartial perspective.52 
For this group of writers ideologies are beliefs and hopes inte-
grated into pictures which show: 
(1) how the present social, economic, and political order 
operates, 
(2) why this is so, and whether it is good or bad, and 
(3) what should be done about it, if anything, may be 
termed an "ideology. 11 53 
It may be necessary to fill in the blank spaces of the above 
scheme. Before these "social worlds" can be fully perceived, it is 
necessary for some type of awareness or consciousness to take place. 
The psychological awareness of differential properties such as what 
is "black" or "white"- is not the answer. It is more a blend of moral 
awareness and W. I. Thomas' idea of the definition of the social 
situation that can be utilized here. Thus, the soc iologists' r eaction 
to political and economic problems is the essence of the sociological 
formulation of ideologies. Despite radical tendencies it might be 
said that the works of c. Wright Mills and Herbert Marcuse furnished 
a ready formulation for New Left politics because it coincided, 
theoretically, with their central theme which was nqt "revolution" as 
much as it was "outrage." An example of this is as fpllows: 
This country, with its thirty-some years of liberalism, 
can send 200,000 young men to Vietnam to kill and die 
in the most dubious of wars, but: it cannot get 100 voter 
registrars to go to Mississippi.54 
The message that these writers attempt to convey, with some 
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contradiction, is that as long as one's ideology does not deviate too 
far from "capitalism-liberalism" it is on safe grounds. This can 
include all forms of individualistic abberations. Once, however, one 
goes beyond the norms of individualism into the camp of collectivism 
one is suspect. Among the contradictions one may locate within this 
rationale is that the corporation is an individual and that the state 
treats all of its citizens with equal justice and consideration. 
As the sociologist ponders the above it may be that, physically , 
his or her mission insofar as formulation of ideologies are concerned, 
can only be partially realized and fulfilled on the university campus. 
It may be that like the Chine se "foot doctors" who administer to 
primary public health needs of an agraria n population of millions the 
American sociologists will have to take to the backroads and explain 
what citizenship means and how ideology works. Durkheim said that 
we need lawye r s to remind us of the rights we have lost as member s of 
society. Lawyers have not maintained the necessary level of integrity 
to perform this necessary service; they have been char acterized a s 
both "pr i e sts" and "prostitute s" of the capitalist system. New Left 
politics and radical sociology has a mission i n mind f or soc i ologists 
who prefer to be more than merely teachers of sociology. Thus, if the 
sociologist is so concerned with publication and consultation, l e t 
him go forth to the peop l e . Hi s r ewards may be moderate . He wil l be in 
a position to gather. genuine, spontaneous data 1 always a methodological 
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problem. He will be plugged in to genuine publications of how people 
really feel about important issues. It may be that he will have to do 
as the old generation of midwives, "live off the ~arden." There is 
no law that says that thiscannothappen. The FBI may be concerned 
since they must constantly seek new activities to justify their exis-
tence. The alternatives are bleak: teaching dull college students 
who firmly believe (a false ideology) that a college degree is designed 
to help them secure employment. One notes that reacting to a captive 
audience of students is not the same as reacting to society. An 
alternative of straight teaching may be leaving the campus every other 
year in order to keep plugged in to social reality. 
Visiting communes is no substitute for visiting representative 
communities. Communes have their own problems and are simply nothing 
more than temporary settlements of fragmented individuals who have 
given up the struggle completely .. and who seek solace among members of 
their own kind in the mud and sweat of a primitive sub-culture.SS 
"The commune .•• includes sharing housing, economic activities and 
income, child-rearing, and perhaps even sex in the form of an exte nded 
family. 11 S6 
The important thing to remember is that no matter what changes 
are wrought by communes or other forms of experimental group living 
there is little immediate impact insofar as society at large is con-
cerned. The point can be made that communes may have a discordant 
effect in society. It might be that since we know that they are 
available that we feel as though there is little need for socie ty at 
large to continue to e ntertain ide ologies . The crux of the matter is 
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that conununes can be rejected and that persons can return to Roszak's 
"air conditioned nightmare." 
Other critics of American ideologies see a relationship where 
power i s valued more than knowledge and that what we have is a kind 
of "voluntary totalitarianism" rather than a "participatory democracy." 
Harvey Cox sununarizes the issue quite well when he states: "We persist 
in living by stale ideologies deriving from a bygone day. 1157 
Staughton Lynd, on the other hand, fears that issues in regards 
to New Left politics will eventually be watered down. His statement 
is as follows: 
The New Left leaders are afraid of the American talent for 
assimilating dissent--and this is already happening to 
some of their ideas. Practically everybody has a kind 
word for decentralization, in the interests of e fficiency 
if not humanity; the war on poverty, while now bogged 
down, will be. carried on • • • . The present New Left 
will undoubtedly fade without producing many middle-
aged radicals.SS 
One subject which will only be briefly touched on here is "ideol-
ogy " and "law." Many public officials seem to be unaware of what 
Sumner said many years ago about laws being grounded in the mores. 
An English writer feels strongly that: 
I n a democratic society at least, laws, if they are 
to be successful, must rest largel y upon consent .. 
If laws are to be effectively obeyed, their demands 
cannot go much beyond what people are prepared to 
do.59 
Perhaps the i mpending danger of ideo logy is that it is a r ecogni-
tion that political and economic conditions can be d i fferent than they 
presently are. Some mi ght label this purposive social change. It is 
the promise o f security which works aga inst the grain of ideology . I t 
is also the type of teaching which tells u s in no uncertain terms that 
major historical events are in the past since they are unnecessary for 
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for the future. Thus', democracy has been achieved by our forefathers 
and we are here to enjoy the fruits of their labors. 
It is a matter of record that the New Deal of the 1930's and 
1940's had ideologic al characteristics. One interested ' source evaluates 
this period as follows: 
Though the New Deal was non-ideological, thi s do es not mean 
that it was anti-ideological. In fact, it was shot through 
with ideologies, or utopias, whichever emphasis one may 
prefer. Total planners and piecemeal planners, budget-
balancers and deficit-spenders, trust-regulators and trust-
busters, protectionists and free traders, "sound money" 
proponents and inflationists--all vied with each o ther 
under the hospitable tent that was the New Deal . . .• The 
New Deal was engaged in a continuous effort to d i sengage 
itself from ideological commitments . 60 
The above, of course, is open to some debate. One might speculate 
that the New Deal, appearing as a radical innovation at its inceptio n 
in 1933, was, in effect, a stop-gap measure on the part of the gove rn-
me nt to placate the threat of impending radical pressures from out side 
the government. When the threat of radicalism vanished during the 
incipient stages of World War II, the New Deal also vanished. One 
could also argue in favor of the New Deal being considered an ideology, 
if, for no other reason, as a middle-ground between capitalism and 
socialism containing characteristics of each system . It might be that 
some political scientists cannot see their way to step outside of our 
present set of institutions to see the situation from a genuine 
intellectual- ideological position. 
One sociologist who has no problem in making sensible compar i sons 
along ideological lines is Norman Birnbaum. It can be said of him 
that he is as familiar with European as he is with American sociology . 
If anyone is capable of continuing in the tradition of c. Wright Mills, 
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it is Birnbaum. In one of his early. papers he attempted a comparison 
of Marx and Weber where he concluded: 
Weber ••• utilized Marx, not by accepting his hypotheses, 
but by testing them and amending them. He eschewed (avoided) 
the assumption of a mechanical production of values (and of 
ideology, generally) and made explicit what Marx had left 
implicit: the psychological functions of belief systems 
. • • he gave the ideological variable an explicit indepen-
dent status in the analysis of social change • . • but he 
left implicit •.. the psychological origins of an 
ideology.61 
The above is important for several reasons. Birnbaum writes in 
the tradition of Marx and Weber. He never loses sight of the major 
promises attributed to ideology. He constantly searches for an answer 
as if he were Marx evaluating Weber, or, from time to time, Weber 
evaluating Marx. The common ground, of course, is two-fold: ideology 
and the capitalist system. This explains why he can shift from 
bureaucracy to religion to higher education without l osing time or 
composure. This also explains how he can critique the works of Davi d 
Riesman as effectively as he can explore the myths of the British 
Empire. 
In one of his most important articles Birnbaum sees the crisis of 
the sociological study of ideology as one whi ch "entails a confronta-
tion of Marxism .•• and 'bourgeois' sociology . 1162 It is interesting 
to note that this essay, "The Sociological Study of Ideology, 1940-
1960," appeared approximate ly ten yea r s be fore Gouldne r' s The Coming 
Crisis of Western Sociology. Gouldner cites Birnbaum only once in 
regarding Marxism's ability to continue to change without l oss of 
i denti ty and purpose . 
Expounding t he Marxian interpretation is one of t he hallmarks of 
Bir nba um's craft . For him it is class r e lations, not c lass per se whi ch 
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should be the focus of attention. Also, Mannheim's relative position 
is awkward, but it is something to get started with. Mead is also 
important for the scientific study of the sociology of ideology. 
Central to Birnbaum's writing is that ideology is not properly under-
stood by sociologists. He explains as follows: 
The primary ideological difficulty of many contemporary 
sociologists is that they are unwilling to face up to the 
implications of the problem of ideology in their own work. 
The promise of the achievement of a science (with an 
articulated body of concepts, verified hypotheses, and 
standardized techniques) has been taken for the achive-
ment itself.63 
Additional comments on ideology by Birnbaum are as follows: 
(1) Social consciousness is not exhausted by ideology. 
(2) We must understand the social psychology of a class 
in order to understand its ideology. 
(3) The ideology of a class, however, cannot be derived 
directly from its psychology. 
(4) Ideology is • . • the assimilation in thought of real 
social relationships. 
(5) The persistence of religion in capitalist society can 
be explained not alone by its utilization by the 
exploiting classes, but because of the persistence of 
fear. 
(6) The concept of ideology has been severed from its 
philosophical bases and discussions of it no longer 
entail epistemological dispute.64 
The above all lend themselves to interesting hypotheses if not 
formulations of ideology. Birnbaum is distressed at the lack of inte-
gration between political science, history, philosophy and sociology 
in that they need each other to accomplish meaningful ends in research. 
He points out, also that "Marx--after a century of refutations--is 
the one sociologist who cannot be ignored. 1165 Perhaps the remarkable 
thing about Birnbaum is that he can be as critical of the Soviet 
Union as he is of the United States. His erudite scholarship is of 
the highest magnitude and his writing is expressive of independence, 
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creativity, imagination and brutal honesty. If C. Wright Mills 
fostered the sociological imagination, it could be said that Birnbaum 
fostered the position of ideology from fragments of philosophy to 
wholistic social reality. 
Birnbaum totally rejects the "end of ideology" debate and spends 
a great deal of time explaining that technicians can be as ideological 
as politicians. In another connection he rationalizes the many faces 
of power when he says: "One of this century's great cultural shocks 
has been this: the spread of education and literacy, the exper-
. f lf . f d . 1166 ience o se -government, has not in act ma e men more sovereign. 
The problem of ideology appears to be moving into the mainstream 
of American sociology at a slow but steady pace. At the 1974 meeting 
of the American Sociological Association there were some nine papers 
presented representing ideological themes: 
ASA Annual Meeting: 1974 
Papers Dealing with Ideology/Sociology of Knowledge 
(1) "Political Ideology and the Chicano Movement," Gerald 
Rosen, California State University, Fullerton 
(2) "Ideology, Social Structure, and Crisis," Jean Lipman-
Blumen, National Institute of Education 
(3) "Feminist Ideology and Hard-Nosed Methodology," 
Robert Brannon, Brooklyn College, CUNY 
(4) "Professional Ideologies and Specialized Medicine: 
1967 to the Present," Gail Lee Cafferata, University 
of Rochester 
(5) "Phenomenological vs Structural Marxism: An Ideological 
Debate," John Horton, University of California, 
Los Angeles 
(6) "Myth and Scientific Versions of Idealism in the 
Sociology of Knowledge," Martin Wenglensky (no 
affiliation provided) 
(7) "A Problem of Scoiological Praxis: The Case for Inter-
ventive Observation in Field Work," Y. Michal Bodemann, 
Brandeis University 
(8) "Can and Should Ideology be Avoided in Scientific 
Civilization?" (bilingual), Leopold Roserunayr, 
Institut fur Soziologie, Austria 
(9) "The State and Ethnocentrism," Jan Smith, University 
of Pennsylvania 
In addition to the above, one finds other works featuring the 
theme of "ideology" which are substantial contributions towards a 








Ideology and Discontent67 
Visibles and Invisibles68 
69 Worlds of the Future 
70 
Ideology and the Development of Sociological Theory 
The Discovery of Society71 
Ideology and Change.72 
What these studies indicate is that there are new developments 
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and new interests in the formulations and understandings of ideologies 
and related topics. A case can be made for the fact that the true 
frontiers of sociology do not lie in "computer science." The true 
frontiers of sociology lie in developing "social worlds" of under-
standing for "whole man." There are new discoveries to be made and 
whether they be called concepts, principles or theories is not of 
primary importance. There are also new "roles" awaiting the sociolo-
gist who can but live only a "half-life" within the cloister of the 
university. 
Many years ago Bertrand Russell said that a student in America 
could only get a good education despite the system--that the system 
worked against his getting a good, sound education. He also said 
that professors in both England and America should be reminded that 
the student knows how to read. Thus, the ideal situation is to have 
the student visit with the professor from time to time and to take 
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his examinations when he is ready. Were this system incorporated into 
the present mode of higher learning, the sociologist could be free 
to study groups, communities, industries, problems and ideologies. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
A NEW MODEL FOR IDEOLOGY 
There is little unanimity in the use of the concept "ideology" 
in the literature of social science and the humanities. In this con-
nection "ideology" shares some common attributes with "sociology" 
itself; hence, when they are used together there is even more confusion. 
Divorced from its "sociology of knowledge" frame of reference, 
ideology approximates something akin to a belief system, rational or 
irrational, supported by a degree of consensus in the society or in the 
group to which it is applicable. This, of course, does not allow a 
great deal of latitude for scientific studies, which may in itself 
explain why scholars other than followers of Mills and Birnbaum have 
turned their backs on ideology as a tool of scientific explanation for 
the behavioral sciences. 
A good example of what is implied above is, perhaps, more familiar 
to the "political scientist" than to the sociologist other than to the 
"political sociologist." It is the political scientist who lives 
with various explanations of "democracy" during most of his career in 
our society--something which might be described as a "keeper of the 
faith." After writing a whole book on the "theory of democracy," 
this is how a reputable political scientist handles the problem: 
As to the theory of democracy in general, the tenor of 
this essay has been that democracy is best thought of as 
a political system together with its explanatory and 
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justifying theory. Democracy in this view is not a unique 
ideology, comparable, say to Marxism--Leninism with its 
interpretation of history and its recipe for utopia. That 
is, it is not a comprehensive philosophy embracing all of 
life and pointing the way to invariable ideals by means 
of a fixed policy program.! 
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Even the "best-selling" author, Alvin Toffler, formerly associated 
with magazines such as Fortune and Playboy and who knows when and when 
not to use sociological interpretations, approaches ideology in the 
following manner: 
No man's model of reality is a purely personal product. 
While some of his images are based on first-hand observa-
tion, an increasing proportion of them today are based on 
messages beamed to us by the mass media and the people 
around us. Thus the degree of accuracy in his model to 
some extent reflects the general level of knowledge in 
society. And as experience and scientific research pump 
more refined and accurate knowledge into society, new 
concepts, new ways of thinking, supersede, contradict, 
and render obsolete older ideas and world views.2 
One also wonders on what empirical grounds another popular 
author, Charles A. Reich, can become so "ideological" in view of the 
fact that even with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to 
bolster the sagging Constitution, the Civil Rights Movement has all 
but ended in confusion and remorse. Reich proclaims: 
Today we are witnesses to a great moment in history: 
a turn from the pessimism that has closed in on 
modern industrial society; the rebirth of a future; 
the rebirth of a people in a sterile land. If that 
process had to be summed up in a single word, that 
word would be freedom.3 
The above example may well be a case of an author using the social-
ogy of knowledge frame of reference without himself being aware of it. 
In one of the few empirical studies dealing with this subject, John 
Walton, finds that he has a problem of definition. The manner in 
which he seeks a solution is as follows: 
Mannheim recognized two usages of the "theory of ideology," 
the first referring to intentional falsifications or 
incorrect observations . and the second ref erring to 
"total mental structure" . . • he termed the first type 
"particular" conceptions and the second "total" concep-
tions • • . it was the second type that interested 
Mannheim • . •. 4 
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The above writer attempted to measure "ideological" perspectives 
against symbols of "power." Although his conclusions are tentative, 
"this analysis documents the significance of the sociology of knowledge 
as a perspective for interpreting social research. 115 This study does 
not attempt to develop a model for ideology or the sociology of know-
ledge but, for practical purposes, it may serve as a beginning. 
However, in a simple way, the first type of John Walton's explana-
tion may be referred to as the "Marxian" model and the second type as 
the "Mannheimian" model. The problem with this explanation is that 
some writers use the former when they really mean the latter and vice 
versa. 
The concept, if not methodology, of models may be used in the 
sense that Ralph Thomlinson has explained: 
Models have three connotations. They may represent states, 
objects, and events in much the same sense in which an 
architect constructs a small-scale model of a building. 
They may imply a degree of perfection or idealization, as 
in a model student or a model husband. Or they may demon-
strate how something works. Generally models are less 
complicated than reality and hence lead more to causal 
generalizations. They are also easier to manipulate and 
transport than the real thing.6 
In a general sense, by utilizing Thomlinson's concept of model, 
one could say that, for all practical purposes, an ideology is a model, 
per se, since it explains a position about society that may be far 
removed from reality or it may point to the way that society should be 
{utopia) rather than the way that it actually is. One could also read 
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many gradations into the scheme from "positive" to "negative," from 
"false" to "true" or from "radical" to "conservative." One could 
debate the issue at length in order to determine which "model," the 
"Marxian" or the "Mannheimian," comes closest to the "fallacy of 
affirming the consequent" in that "its conclusion may be false even 
if its promises are true. 117 Or, from a different viewpoint, one could 
pay heed to Jerome R. Ravetz who cautions: 
The ideal of science as demonstrative knowledge excludes 
the possibility of the obscurity of the very objects of 
the demonstration; and in the dominant traditions of the 
philosophy of science, such an obscurity would destroy 
the claim of science to be knowledge of any worthwhile 
sort • • • the basic categories of our experience are 
incapable of precise definition and unique analysis. 
Concepts such as "cause," "change," and the like, have 
in them an inexhaustible supply of subtleties and 8 
ambiguities as material for philosophical inquiry. 
Thus, in projecting models, one should proceed with caution. A 
comment from Florian Znaniecki warns that: " ••• the people who wish 
to solve a practical problem are an integral part of that very problem 
and no technological or ideological activity can be isolated from other 
activities of its kind. 119 
Znaniecki continues: 
The kind of knowledge they deem useful is conditioned 
by their vision of the future, and this vision is limited 
in turn by the kind of knowledge they have already 
utilized in their roles as participants in the present 
culture. 10 
Using the above for guidelines, it is possible to list the fol-
lowing characteristics which manifest themselves in attempting to 
conceptualize via ideological model building: 
(1) concepts of ideology can be, at best, approximations 
(2) concepts of ideology do not lend themselves to the conven-
tional scrutiny of logic 
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(3) concepts of ideology are grounded in culture 
(4) concepts of ideology are links to social reality 
(5) concepts of ideology which display critical limitations 
are reflections of concrete, social limitations. 
In addition to the above some further insight into the problem 
is offered by John C. McKinney who states: 
Knowing is not a matter of proceeding from the uncertain 
effects in the individual to the world beyond which is 
supposed to cause those effects--scientif ic research 
always posits an unquestioned world of existence within 
which its problems appear and are tested. Any part of 
this world may become problematic and, therefore, an 
object of the knowing process.11 
This same writer advises: "There is no such thing as a type 
12 
independent of the purposes for which it was constructed." One has 
the feeling that by following McKinney that there is no room in his 
scheme for ideology. How does one differentiate, for example, the 
difference between "knowing" and "ideology"? It might be, not only 
reacting to McKinney's postulates, but to Znaniecki's as well, that 
the last hope for eventually mastering the "methodology of ideology" 
would be with some linkage between sociology and social psychiatry 
so that dreams (both from sleeping as well as from day dreams) could 
be scientifically evaluated for ideological content. 
Still another view of ideology is helpful in an attempt to 
resolve ideologies into models: 
Ideologies are composed of what men believe to be man's 
purposes • they purport to define what man's purposes 
ought to be, as well as what they are • • • [also] ideolo-
gies are not set up to be empirically tested, but are 
believed absolutely to be true; they function at the level 
of social myth • • • [and] ideology has, in the past, 
usually defined its ol~site as evil or as something to 
be eradicated • • . • 
The above writer feels as though "ideologies of the future may 
14 
take on more of the intellectual quality of scientific theory." 
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This may be an important development for the future. For the present 
one may enumerate the following propositions: 
(1) ideologies do not lend themselves to empirical evaluation 
(2) ideologies are used as mechanisms of persuasion 
(3) ideologies compete with theories for the establishment of 
belief and truth 
(4) ideologies, in a crude way, may be considered as self-
contained models 
(5) ideologies are more conducive to philosophical than 
sociological manipulation and evaluation. 
Another approach to the attempt at model building is what may 
be called evaluating proximity to the "dominant system of thought." 
The proponents of this model explain, at length, as follows: 
By "dominant system of thought" we mean capitalism--
liberalism extended and deepened, expanded comprehen-
sively to incorporate the language, concepts, logic, 
premises, assumptions, and other tools of thinking 
generally available to people in the society.15 
There are, however, variations on this theme. As long as no 
ideological change is anticipated such as the current "pitch" on tele-
vision of "Baseball, Hotdogs, Apple Pie, and Chevrolet," this may be 
considered within the norm. The same would apply to "some anticipated 
change" but not radical change to completely transform the "system." 
This is why, perhaps, "New Deal" and "Welfare State" as well as 
"Democracy" remain such excellent subjects for debate in conventional 
sociology and political science text books. 
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These same authors raise the question: "What would it take to go 
beyond this sytem of thought?" Their reply is as follows: " • it 
would require not a reordering of values, but the complete rejection of 
many traditional values and the:inclusion of new and unfamiliar values 
in their place. 1116 
Once again, it is not too difficult to evalute the "positive" 
position--as stated above--and the "negative" position as being nothing 
more than Mannheim and Marx with some variation on the classical theme. 
Or, stated in more simple terms: "Democracy" is the dominant theme 
and "Marxism-Leninism" is the negative theme. From the point of view 
of cultural relativity, however, inside the USSR the USA system could 
be "Bourgeoise Capitalism" and the positive-negative polarity system 
could be reversed. 
Thus, one may suggest to the concerned scholar, that any meaning-
ful model of ideology should be grounded in culture. Znaniecki calls 
our attention to this important consideration. It may be stated, also, 
that in addition to "positive" and "negative" differentials in ideo-
logies one may observe those that are "active" and "passive," "singular" 
and "pluralistic" and that they are relative, at all times, to "time," 
"place" and "circumstances" as inf erred above in the example of USSR 
and USA ideological formulations from within. One should not forget, 
also, that in addition to "economic" and "political" ideologies or 
those relating to the "political-economy" in the 19th Century tradition, 
there are also those relating to religion and ethnic or racial identity. 
What this complex problem suggests is that ideologies are plural-
istic rather than singular. One may support both "dominant" and 
"passive" or "marginal" if not "negative" ideologies at the same 
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time. It is similar to the situation with Black Americans who may be 
of minority status because of skin color but who are of majority 
status because of religion, Christianity. Thus, one may suggest cer-
tain similarities between ideologies as explained above and an inter-
pretation of culture from the old German-Austrian "Kulturkreislehre" 
(Culture Circles) School. This theory, in brief, is stated as follows: 
If ••• a culture complex embraces all the essential and 
necessary categories of human culture, material culture, 
economic life, social life, custom, religion, then we 
call it a "culture circle," because returning into itself 
and, hence (sic), also assures its independent existence. 
Should it neglect or fail to satisfy one of the more im-
portant human needs, then a substitute for this must be 
called from another culture--the greater the number of 
such substitutes that are required, the more it would 
cease to be an independent culture circle. 17 
"Culture circles," according to Wilhelm Schmidt, have "time" 
and "space" dimensions and may be likened to an "organism." Two main 
types of "culture circles" are those which have continuous distribu-
tion and those which have discontinuous diffusion. The former may be 
likened to branches of a tree which represents close and harmonious 
growth and relationships. The latter are negative and point to slow 
transitions in different directions. 18 
Much more could be projected here insofar as comparing "ideologies" 
to "culture circles." This, of course, would project a much more 
complex model than that which is presently utilized. Thus, purposes 
of this comparison are more exploratory than definitive. This could 
be the subject of a great deal of research in the future. 
Additional insight afforded by the "Culture Circle School" is 
as follows: 
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It is not so much a matter of facilitation or hindering 
of the diffusion of culture, but rather to what place 
the older culture strata will be pushed by the later 
younger cultures. The latter are in general more advanced 
economically and, consequently, also greater in numbers. 
Therefore, they will not overlay the older cultures and 
mingle with them except where the older cultures cannot 
yield any more, but they will crowd them out and push theM 
into so-called "out-of-the-way districts. 11 19 
The above demonstrates the possibility of a conceptualization of 
ideology in a new dimension which can be more applicable to research 
and to general understanding. It appears that the great preoccupation 
with ideology has been in tracing its origins, historically, and in 
establishing its linkages between the past and the present. This is 
not to denigrate the value of scholars engaged in historiography, 
epistemology and phenomenology. But sociology requires an explanation 
which, if not empirical, can at least assimilate conditions of 
empiricism if it is not to become a desiccated social science. Thus, 
sociology has outgrown its earlier philosophical preoccupation with 
the "law of universal evolution. 1120 
What the above discourse may suggest is that it may be more imper-
tant for the sociologist, philosopher, political scientist and other 
interested scholars including journalists and free-lance writers to 
perform their services based on a more equitable division of labor if 
that is possible. This would permit the sociologist to be more con-
cerned with the function of ideologies, latent and manifest, rather 
than with evolving philosophical systerns for which, in most cases, he 
is poorly prepared. By the same token, there is no reason for "ideal-
ogy" to be a "dumping ground" of confusion. As long as it remains a 
mystique and a summary for confused thinking, it can hardly be 
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evaluated for what it is, the antecedent if not independent variable 
in a socio-cultural setting. At present there is no possible way to 
adequately explain the principle of conversion with respect to ideology 
despite the emphasis placed on actors, particularly leaders, who carry 
out or personify the ideology. Also, as implied in the comparison of 
ideology to culture circles, there is much more need for a means of 
evaluating competing if not alternative ideologies than that which 
presently exists. 
Another suggestion for a developing model of ideology might con-
tain a means of differentiating between primary, secondary and tertiary 
levels. By way of suggestion one may conceive of the concept "chosen 
people" as a primary ideology, "ethclass"--status of blacks among 
blacks--as a secondary ideology and one's views on American Indians 
(whether they should retain their own cultural identities or become 
full assimilated Americans) as a tertiary ideology. It could even 
turn out in some cases that secondary and tertiary ideologies would be 
more important for some individuals than would primary ideologies. An 
individual could be little moved by national or international politics 
(primary) but be extremely concerned with racism (secondary or tertiary 
depending on his or her identity and situation). 
Some may contend that ideology is the proper vehicle for persua-
sion in mass society, and this is of primary concern to the political 
scientist. There should also be ideological grounds for comprehending 
that which gives competition to "charismatic leaders." Despite Mills 
and others who contend that "liberalism" has seen its best days, one 
might argue that in provincial states in America such as Arkansas and 
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Oklahoma that "liberalism" is about as radical as one may be and still 
hold public office or work as a state functionary. 
The proper understanding of ideology, however, remains the key 
to the comprehension of the values which motivate individuals to 
participate in social movements. Alvin Toffler is of the opinion 
that three ingredients are needed for proper execution of any community 
enterprise: (1) the creator element which includes such individuals 
as playwrights, poets, novelists, composers and others of a creative 
stamp; (2) the disseminator element or those institutions which 
communicate the work of the creator to the public; and (3) the con-
sumer or the one who purchases the ticket for the spectacle. This 
same formulation can help to understand who buys what social movement 
because of the expectation of benefits for everyone (ideology). 21 
In other words, ideology, in the above sense, can be equated with the 
purchase of a ticket or "package deal" designed to do one of two 
things: (1) maintain the status quo or (2) change tome aspect of 
the social order, other things being held equal. 
One problem which any model of ideology would have difficulty 
in containing as well as in explaining is what has come to be known 
as "ideological repression." This, in many ways, would call for some 
critical social-psychological explanations. Alan Wolfe who has written 
a book on this topic explains as follows: 
Direct ideological repression involves both a direct 
attack on potential competing ideologies--such as a 
return to the free market from the Right or socialism 
from the Lef t--as well as a continued def ens~ of the 
existing ideology of corporate liberalism. 22 
Professor Wolfe explains further when he says: 
In the twentieth century, those who hold power in liberal 
democracies have come to realize the importance of ideol-
ogy. Acceptance of received ways of thinking, it has 
been found, is not accidental but has to be worked at. 
This need has given rise to a group of experts at 
ideological indoctrination • • • .23 
There are two important conclusions arrived at by Professor 
Wolfe which are as follows: 
(1) The goal of ideological repression now is to win 
support for the capitalist system, not for any one 
of its policies. 
(2) The ultimate goal of ideological repression is to 
help people support their own repressors.24 
Joyce Kolko sees a similar development in her recent book when 
she states: 
Anti-Soviet ideology is certainly agreeable to America's 
more sophisticated leaders, but only so long as it serves 
their interests. The so-called "Cold War" set the frame-
work of these interests for more than two decades and . 
two wars. 25 
In addition to the above, there are several critical questions 
which should be asked in developing a model of ideology. They are 
as follows: 
(1) Where does the ideology come from? 
(2) How old is the ideology? 
(3) Under what conditions is the ideology most potent? 
(4} What is the strength of the ideology? 
(5) How radical is the ideology? 
(6) How conservative is the ideology? 
(7) How far removed from truth is the ideology? 
(8) How does the ideology compare to social reality? 
The above questions should be helpful in establishing certain 
guidelines. The same may be said for the following statements which 
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recognize the significance of ideology. These definitions are as 
follows: 
(1) Loneliness: no man or woman is an "isolate" with respect 
to ideology. 
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(2) Morality: the ability of the individual and group to accept 
some ideological influences and to reject others. 
(3) Ethics: the extent and ability of being sophisticated to the 
point of balancing ideological inputs and outputs. 
(4) Bureaucracy: that type of social organization which prohibits 
both "false" and "real" self-consciousness. 
(5) Power: the extent to which distortion is managed in order 
to circumvent the free play of humanistic ideological 
intercourse. 
(6) Beauty: the look or feel of harmonious ideologies. 
(7) Politics: the ability to create primary ideologies and to 
justify their existence even though they are drawn from 
secondary or tertiary levels or from their opposites or from 
rejected ideologies. 
(8) Social Movements: the ability to synchronize leadership, 
followers and doctrine (ideology} so that all three elements 
reflect similar degrees of symbolism in search of purposive 
social change. 
(9) Depressed Class: one in which the ideology is weak, dis-
torted or non-existent by community norms. 
(10) Education: a process in which technology i9 subsumed under 
an ideological umbrella so that the individual may safely be 
drawn into the system. 
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(11) Radicalism: the inclination to measure positive ideologies 
exclusively in terms of their opposites. 
(12) Utopia: that place where ideology and social reality are one 
and the same. 
(13) Propaganda: a form of mutilated ideology since it has been 
stripped of any potential for rationalization. 
Robert E. Lane in his book Political Ideology also offers some 
interesting characteristics of political ideologies which are important 
26 
for contemplating a model: 
(1) They deal with the questions: Who will be the rulers? 
How will the rulers be selected? By what principles 
will they govern? 
(2) They consistute an argument; that is, they are intended 
to persuade and to counter opposing views. 
(3) They integrally affect some of the major values of 
life. 
(4) They embrace a program for the defense or reform or 
abolition of important social institutions. 
(5) They are, in part, rationalizations of group interests 
--but not necessarily the interests of all groups 
espousing them. 
(6) They are normative, ethical, moral in tone and 
content. 
(7) They are (inevitably) torn from their context in a 
broader belief system, and share the structural and 
stylistic properties of that system.27 
Professor Lane adds to the above characteristics with some 




ideologies have these qualities: 
They are group beliefs that individuals borrow; most 
people acquire an ideology by identifying (or dis-
identify ing) with a social group. 
They have a body of sacred documents (constitutions, 
bills of rights, manifestos, declarations), and heroes 
(founding fathers, seers and sages, originators and 
great interpreters). 
And all ideologies, like all other beliefs, imply an empiri-
cal theory of cause and effect in the world, and a theory 
of the nature of man. 28 
Next, one should not forget the Marxian position on ideology 
which is for the most part directed against the bourgeoise: 
Every ideology systematizes [formalizes] an aggregate of 
illusions, mutilated and distorted representations which 
nonetheless retain sufficient reference to "reality" 
(praxis) to appear true, to find a place in this reality, 
to be experienced.29 
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The above materials are offered as suggestions and approximations 
to a model of ideology which, at present, can be only in its incipient 
stages. The ideas from Lane are well known. The questions raised by 
the writer along with the several definitions are synthesized from 
readings and thoughts on the subject. Ideology is still considered 
more a side line with sociologists. In some respects, more serious 
work has been done by political scientists, but their work suffers from 
narrow limitations. 
The culture circle theory is offered here as no panacea. It is 
merely a suggestion. One should be aware of the fact that false inter-
pretations are possible by using the method of culture circle theory. 
Ideology is an entity, thus far, which confounds many social scientists. 
It reminds one of the fact that William James, the great American 
scholar of the late 19th Century and early 20th Century, "never found a 
cure for his neuroses, but he learned to live with them. 1130 So it is 
with ideology and the field of sociology at this time. For others, a 
small number who are searching for more than a cursory explanation of 
society, ideology may be likened to being the poetry of sociology, 
theory the prose. For others ideology may be viewed as the ''advance 
man" of sociology in that if we know the symbols we can make some 
meaningful predictions concerning the future devoid of empty 
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stereotypes. For all of this to materialize a model of ideology would 
be helpful; it would be both a discovery and an invention. It would 
be a major social scientific breakthrough. 
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CHAPTER IX 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Ideology is one of the most important concepts extant in the 
social sciences and in sociology, in particular; yet it remains, at 
the same time, one of the least understood terms in the literature of 
both the social sciences and the humanities. Two trends are noted: 
(1) it is used as a catch-all for all factors and tendencies which 
have not been explained and (2) it is used in a manner which can be 
called nothing other than distortion. There are the classical European 
definitions which derive from Marx and Mannheim but, for most contem-
porary use, the term is employed as a kind of mystique explanation for 
why individuals and groups react or respond in a certain manner or 
why they uphold a certain attitude rather than another. In brief, it 
amounts to the implementation of ideology as myth or folklore.. It is 
the contention made in this dissertation that ideology is too important 
to be neglected. 
Be that as it may, much is hidden from view insofar as any investi-
gation of ideology is concerned. This is why the concept "ideological 
drift" may turn out to be the unknown entity which determines the 
success or failure of certain critical social relationships, particu-
larly those concerned with diplomacy and protocol. It would appear, 
then, that compatibility has many sides other than what is ordinarily 
believed to be most significant. It is conceivable, then, that in the 
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future, sociologically, one may not only be known by such common 
attributes as age, sex, race, educational level and income level but, 
also, by "ideological level." Perhaps some of this is taking place 
at the present time. 
For the present, ideology will reamin for some time as a formula-
tion for disenchantment with the world. It appears that what is taking 
place in our society is an attempt to "break out" of the shell which 
the above personifies. There are demands for "rights" of one group 
without any concern for the ultimate outcome insofar as society as a 
whole may be concerned. Leonard Reissman has explained this dilemma 
quite well. He points out that: 
There is a wide chasm that separates black militants from 
white liberals, even though both contend that their objec-
tive is to achieve equality. For the latter, the means 
leading to cultural integration are less important than 
the goal itself. For black separatists, on the contrary, 
it is the means that are of primary importance because 
the success of the goal depends on them. Therefore, the 
development of a viable base for political power and con-
trol must get the highest priority. 1 
Perhaps there is something biological or organic involved in 
ideology that is not too well understood. It would, for example, if 
we take Reissman's observation seriously, require more than "busing 
to achieve a racial balance" to level these structural differences 
among American citizens. Reviewing the recent literature on poverty 
and the disadvantaged, for example, one finds the following which 
indicates more than a mere passing recognition on the part of the 
following author: 
It has been demonstrated that in the lower income groups 
nutrition problems can pennanently damage the brain cells 
of the individual. Technology may have few answers here. 
For those cildren born and reared in homes where poor 
nutritional habits exist, the best teachers and the 
best facilities may be less than a satisfactory 
answer.2 
160 
How is one to .reconcile the reality of the above positions with, 
as Mills has indicated, the worn out ideology of liberalism? Going 
even beyond that, how can one make sense out of the insight of Barbara 
Ward who has written: 
The Renaissance and the Reformation vastly reinforced 
both the secular knowledge and the political self-
confidence of the rising middle class. They were now 
ready to produce the new forms of cohesion, explanation, 
and function which ended, presumably forever, the old 
unified empires and have dominated the world ever since. 3 
How simple this reconciliation can be for those who have given up 
on the sociology of knowledge. One writer, for example, has noted the 
following: 
Since Mannheim's work has been so thoroughly criticized, 
does it follow that sociology has no claim to the study 
of knowledge? It is the thesis of this paper that the 
sociology of knowledge has no legitimate epistemological 
branch and that only when dealing with substantive aspects, 
i. e., the relationship between ideas and social condi-
tions, is the sociologist qua sociologist upon legitimate 
grounds. 4 
Evaluated in a more positive light the problem looks quite dif-
ferent. This, in effect, lends a great deal of support to the present 
study: 
Mannheim's conclusion stresses the dynamism of his intel-
lectual positions; the methods originating in the cultural, 
philosophical-historical, and civilizational spheres are 
freely interchangeable since each sociocultural phenomenon 
contains a psychic-emotional, dialectically-rational, and 
progressively-rational stratum.5 
Among Mannheim's problems which he attempted to resolve was his 
confrontation with the "cult of the proletariat" and the fact that 
he felt that modern man could be explained only from the point of 
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view of historiography. "His struggle against the relativistic conse-
quences of his thorough going historicism ends equally fatefully with 
the admission that there remains nothing in the end but conunitment to 
ethical and political pragmatism. 116 
The above may be assessed as technical problems in this field 
which, with proper diligence, can be resolved to the mutual satisfac-
tion of concerned scholars and their respective disciplines. An 
updating of Mannheim is needed for progressive studies to be made in 
the area of the sociology of knowledge. Indeed, that procedure has 
already begun as explained in this study. If Mannheim is not updated 
in the future, he will be relegated to historical obsolescence much 
as Isaac Newton's theory of gravity ultimately gave way to Albert 
• • I h f 1 • • 7 Einstein s t eory o re ativity. When Newton had a problem which he 
could not explain "scientifically," he could always explain that the 
heavenly bodies responded in such a manner because it was God's will! 
With Einstein it was a different matter. When he wrote, the ideology 
of science was secularized to such a degree that "cur\red space" was 
a much better explanation than a resort to supernatural powers. 
It may be that Newton is still more important to social scientists 
than they recognize or they are willing to admit: 
Certainly the most important long-range attempt to intro-
duce scientific method into social and political considera-
tions was made by a group of Parisian social philosophers 
including the important Socialist theorists, Saint-Simon 
and Charles Fourier, and the founder of Positivism, August 
Comte. The Newtonian stimulus to the work of these men is 
attested to in Saint-Simon's early attempts to urge a 
Religion of Newton to replace traditional Christianity ..• 
[and] • • • the attempt to construct a science of society 
patterned on the natural sciences. 8 
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One could surmise from the above that it has taken some 150 years 
to recognize that sociology may be on the wrong track, that the natural 
science model poses much too many pitfalls and shortcomings for the 
social scientist and that since "value free" sociology is a "myth" it 
is now equally important for the sociologist to know his "ideology" 
as well as his "methodology." Even Galileo and Descartes in their own 
time were aware of what Jerome R. Ravetz calls "ideological sensitivity" 
and its limitations. 9 
Thus, the recognition of ideology as potential action and a 
source of integration by the sociologist is important. If this is 
neglected, the sociologist will find himself taking a posture on 
issues of which he or she is not only unfamiliar but, in some cases, 
totally ignorant. A case in point would be the rise of Skinner on the 
horizon of behaviorism. With the popular press hammering away at the 
loss of "autonomous man" and the wonders of "operant conditioning" the 
sociologist of traditional training is hardly able to cope with the 
strong totalitarian undercurrents involved in this type of discourse. 10 
It was not many years ago when Skinner was arguing in favor of 
"teaching machines." He stated: 
. . . we can solve the problem of education without dis-
covering or inventing additional reinforcers. We merely 
need to make better use of those we have. Human behavior 
is distinguished by the fact that it is affected by small 
consequences. Describing something with the right word 
is often reinforcing. 11 
The issue could be about other things as well, such as innate 
differences in IQ scores by racial stocks, unemployment, marijuana, 
sex without responsibility, the Department of Defense Budget. One 
subject which certainly should be of concern to the sociologist from 
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the ideological point of view is what has come to be called the 
"information explosion." This is an area which has been developing 
rapidly as a result of almost constant involvement in warfare combined 
with computerization. A brief history of this activity is given by 
William Preston: 
In 1903 the United States officially began the investiga-
tion of opinion among alien arrivals. From that moment 
its hostility to "subversive" ideas that might weaken the 
state or disturb the peacefulness of social and economic 
relations has steadily grown. The demands of an increas-
ingly military administrative regime for conformity and 
reliability, while more intense, are certainly not new. 
Before the New Deal interlude a pattern of suppression 
was established, much of which became the root of present-
day growth. The thirty years from 1903 until 1933 were 
the first phase of the red scare of today.12 
Linked with the above another author points out that, "OUr nation 
displays a pathological reluctance to debate real issues • • • opinion 
makers resort to ••• formulas stating that America is a healthy land 
and the world's most developed nation. 1113 This is obviously what 
Donald B. Macrae, the British sociologist, has in mind when he claims: 
II ideology is both the distortion of thought by interest--public 
or private, consciously or unconsciously known--and the study of such 
d . . .,14 1stort1on. 
The question which one might raise from Macrae's ideological 
promise is how do we differentiate between voluntary and involuntary 
ideologies? The best response that can be obtained from this writer 
is that, "Every ideology is in a sense a myth, for it declares the 
premises and circumstances on which a man will act, accept, reject, 
15 
dispute, or struggle." Last, this writer takes issue with Marx when 
he states: "In Marx power follows wealth; in life wealth much more 
frequently follows power. 1116 
164 
One should not anticipate too much by way of critique from Macrae 
since his group of essays are not necessarily too well integrated. 
But he does show some brilliant insights, in particular, when he com-
pares Hobbs to Marx: 
Just as Hobbs was only in part right in seeing man as a 
wolf to man, so was Marx only in part correct in seeing 
classes as ever and irreconcilably opposed, for ideology 
is always somewhat shared.17 
The above may aid our understanding in that, at this late date, 
two hundred years after a national revolution, we find that we pay 
more lip service to democracy than genuine support. If the truth 
were really known and there is always the question of what is meant by 
truth, it would probably be revealed that we, as a society, are much 
more preoccupied with an interest in fascism than we are in democracy. 
Perhaps this is what Mosca and Pareto had in mind in their implications 
that: "Political ideologies •.. meet a real social need. They 
permit the mass to consider itself ruled according to some great moral 
. . 1 ,,18 pr1nc1p e. 
One is almost prone to review the works of Freud in order to deter-
mine what, if any, insight may be revealed in explaining a society's 
receptive position towards fascism. There is, of course, the well 
19 
known thesis of Erich Fromm. It may reflect the long period of 
dependency of American youth. Or, perhaps, the Freudian premise that 
problems of childhood which are not resolved later appear as adult 
problems. This may be analogous to the fact that ideologies and the 
problems which the~ create may never be completely resolved. Yet, it 
is the natural function of society to allow the possibility to exist 
that the ideology may, one day, become social reality minus the 
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"political corruption" of the intervening period. This might, for 
keeping with the Freudian tradition, be referred to as "ideology in 
limbo." 
Morris Janowitz explains the response of an organized, professional 
group to morals and ethics which must be resolved for the group to 
continue. In his timely essay, "The Ideology of Professional Psycholo-
gists," he argues that: "American psychology bears the strong imprint 
of an intellectual reaction to Freudian theory, in which the foreign 
h b d 1 . h b . 1 . . " 20 matter as een ea t wit y partia incorporation. As for the 
solution to the problem of fascism, this term appears every bit as 
b . h 'd 1 21 am iguous as t e term i eo ogy. 
There have been numerous problems involved in the creation of this 
study. Leon Bramson has indicated what to expect in such an under-
taking: "There exists no study which attempts to deal with the history 
of American sociology from the standpoint of the sociology of knowledge, 
or as a sustained effort in intellectual history." 22 There is much 
more material in political science than in sociology. Some of this, 
as indicated above, has definite limitations. 
Considerable material pertaining to ideology may be obtained from 
the underground press. One example follows: 
Wanted: JESUS CHRIST 
Alias: The Messiah, Son of God, King of Kings, Prince of 
Peace, etc. 
*Notorious leader of an underground liberation movement 
*Wanted for the following charges: 
- Practicing medicine, wine-making and food distribution 
without a license. 
- Interfering with businessmen in the Temple. 
- Associating with known criminals, radicals, subversives, 
prostitutes, and street people. 
- Claiming to have the authority to make people into God's 
children. 
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*Appearance: Typical hippie type--long hair, beard, robe, 
sandals, etc. 
*Hangs around slum areas, few rich friends, often sneaks out 
into the desert. 
*Has a group of disreputable followers, formerly known as 
"apostles," now called "freemen" (from his saying: "You 
will know the truth and the truth will set you free"). 
BEWARE--This man is extremely dangerous. His insidiously 
inflammatory message is particularly dangerous to young 
people who haven't been taught to ignore him yet. He changes 
men and claims to set them free. 
WARNING: HE IS STILL AT LARGE!23 
This study has made a strong effort to contrast ideologies with 
value judgments as formulated for the most part in economic and politi-
cal doctrines. As Gustav Bergmann has asked: "[Who] could for one 
moment live without making value judgements, and who, even if we could, 
would want to? 1124 
Among the revelations within this study which are of importance 
to the sociologist are the fact that dominant ideologies within the 
USA and the USSR are "truths" within these respective "super" socio-
cultural "worlds." The same point could be argued for the Third World 
societies. As trade and diplomatic intercourse bring the two or three 
worlds closer together, one may anticipate sharper definitions, if not 
clashes, of ideological positions to take place. Or, one may remain 
preoccupied with power and the conspiracy of silence. Or, one may 
attempt a closer reading of social history and find that societies 
with their respective ideologies have always been in a perpetual state 
of fusion. It really isn't necessary for the capitalist to "dig his 
own grave" as the Marxian system of "dialectical materialism" would 
have it. He may be swept aside by changing ideologies at any moment. 
He may later emerge as the "managerial class." 
This study has attempted to do several things: 
167 
(1) to present the case for ideology as it presently exists; 
(2) to review constituent literature and the critique of some 
principle authors; 
(3) to acknowledge the ongoing debates concerning ideology; 
(4) to suggest a possible model for ideology; 
(5) to demonstrate that the sociologist is, largely, ideologically 
naive. 
In addition to the above, there have been several attempts to 
relate ideology to its proper perspective. No firm conclusions may 
be drawn from the above other than to say that "economic" and "politi-
cal" ideologies remain dominant driving forces. One need not be com-
mitted to Marxism in order to agree with Lenin's statement that, 
"Political institutions are a superstructure resting on an economic 
foundation. 1125 Nor for that matter does one need to profess any 
particular ideology to subscribe to the following axiomatic statement: 
"For the sake of maintaining modern organization, an imprisoned minority 
t t 1 . 1 t d . . t 1126 mus con ro a manipu a e ma)or1 y. 
One may begin to see some similar patterns of development in the 
idea of culture circles transformed to ideology. Perhaps there are 
"ideological layers" if not "ideological circles" which are formed in 
patterns of stratification. Although the theory of culture circles 
is no longer popular in cultural anthropology, it could possibly be of 
some utility in sociology. Ideology, in this sense, is largely "cul-
ture history"; hence, the transition should not be too difficult. 
This type of analysis appears important since our complex lives 
are already stratified into several levels or layers. Irving Howe, 
frequent collaborator with Lewis Coser on matters pertaining to 
ideology, points out that we are confronted with three stages during 
this, the contemporary period. He enumerates as follows: 
(1) precapitalist--race, illiteracy, backwardness; 
(2) capitalist--class conflict, economic crisis, 
distribution of wealth; 
(3) postcapitalist--quandaries concerning work, leisure, 
morality, and style, su~h as are sometimes described 
as existential • • • 27 
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All three of these levels of "disorders," according to Howe, are 
experienced pluralistically under "late capitalism." "Problems," he 
claims, "suddenly appear ••• that we had supposed would emerge only 
under socialism. 1128 Thus, economic leveling, whenever it occurs, can 
create its own set of problems. 
Perhaps, the negating factor that Howe is searching for is bureauc-
racy, that type of social organization which responds the same under 
any ideology. This is what Max Weber attempted to explain in his 
writings on this subject. Professor Scaff has recently noted: 
• bureaucracy raises a nearly insurmountable barrier 
against political leadership, and even more significantly, 
it supports an idea of action that increasingly permeates 
the political order. Not only the bureaucrat, but the 
citizen as well becomes a "man of order," driven to act 
only when his security is at stake. 29 
What the sociologist should keep in mind is something that might 
be called, for lack of a better term, the "cost of ideology." Dis-
credit of welfare state policies and the various "deals" (New, Fair, 
and other lesser models). Because welfare programs may be called 
"give-aways" or "down the sewer" actions on the part of the state, we 
allow our ideology of "good government" to hold back on health and 
education measures (more recently, housing may also be included). 
It is, more specifically, contamination with "communism," the 
"bitch goddess," that dictates much of this action just as purging the 
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Red Guards in the People's Republic of China or the blood letting of 
the Stalin era in the Soviet Union was designed to rid these societies 
of capitalistic influences. As Professor Wesson has recently reported: 
"There is apparently no [soviet} ideology of radical change, and if 
Marxism-Leninism has had any effect, it has been to discredit 
alternatives."30 
The sociologist should be on guard for what may be called the 
"blind spots" in a society with roots in ideology. Louis J. Halle has 
commented on this topic in the following manner: "Ideological thinking, 
whether right or wrong, is normative thinking so sure of its own right-
ness as to be intolerant of dissent. 1131 Blind spots may be traced to 
other origins. For example: 
Human nature being plastic, ideologies, by blessing some 
characteristics and damning others, help to produce a 
real difference in the quality of life between one people 
and the next • . . different people can and do draw 
different oractical conclusions from the same ideological 
. 32 premises. 
Ideology, then, it may be argued, plays more than a minor role 
in the structure of society. A critique of how the sociologist may 
be oblivious to the problem is adequately summarized by Richard Quinney: 
The myth of rationality has thus prevented us from knowing 
about anything other than what presently exists. Working 
from a positivistic epistemology, the scientist has never 
been able to transcend the world that is. As a consequence 
we have not been able [and have not dared] to exceed the 
limits of ordinary experience. Politically, our science 
has been an alibi for the status quo. Little wonder that 
twentieth century man has not risen above the problems of 
the age.33 
One is prone to say that the sociologist cannot adequately study 
ideology since he cannot escape from it in order to do so. A basic 
problem of ideology is explained by Quinney which, in effect, could 
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hardly be any different from other disciplines. For such disciplines, 
the "map" has become the "territory" and it may well be the wrong map. 
Another scholar who is perceptive of ideology sees the problem 
from the point of view of American foreign policy. His interpretation 
is as follows: 
At the root of the American crisis in foreign poiicy, then, 
is a failure of political intelligence, an incapAcity to 
see the world for what it is rather than what we would 
like it to be and, consequently, an unwillingness to adjust 
to the "real" world with its never ending conflict and 
strife.34 
Professor Tucker continues: "The irony--and to some the tragedy--
of America's position today is that at the height of her power her 
35 
purpose has become increasingly irrelevant to most of the world." 
Thus, ideology is out there awaiting study by competent sociolo-
gical theoreticians. There are many observations to be made in the 
future. What has been presented here may be viewed essentially as a 
preface to future major studies on this important subject as yet 
unwritten. As long as the social scientist relegates ideology to a 
minor role, he or she will be making an incomplete contribution. What 
must be done is to consciously study the force of ideology as it con-
demns some social movements and blesses others, as it distorts truth 
in some circles and obliterates it in others. 
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